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Abstract
This thesis consists of two essays, linked by the theme of the provision of incentives for
insurance arrangements. The first examines a prominent feature of the U.S. social safety
net. Many of the welfare benefits provided by the U.S. government take the form of
in-kind transfers, such as SNAP (Food Stamps), and these in-kind benefits are provided
both to people who are active participants in the labor market and those who are not,
such as retirees and recipients of long-term disability insurance. I show that, under very
general conditions, consumption margins for agents that do not work should not be
distorted in an ex ante efficient allocation in a standard dynamic Mirleesian framework.
However, I then show that by adding home production to the model, and rationale for
consumption distortions arises for agents that do not work, thus rationalizing the use of
in-kind welfare benefits for retirees and the disabled from an efficiency perspective. The
second essay turns to the crisis in the Eurozone, asking why would low debt members
of a monetary union choose to bailout members with high debt? I propose a novel
mechanism that explains this behavior. The central bank will try to use surprise inflation
to devalue the nominal debt of member countries who are net borrowers, as this will tend
to decrease consumption inequality between households in debtor countries and creditor
countries. Creditor countries can forestall this costly surprise inflation by bailing out
debtor countries, as this reduces between-country inequality and dampens the central
bank’s desire to redistribute. If countries accumulate debt in response bad shocks, the
bailouts mimic a risk sharing arrangement between member countries. The model then
also offers a new theory of why countries would choose to form a monetary union: a
common monetary policy provides the incentives required for risk sharing.
iii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The design of risk sharing arrangements for private agents frequently poses a simple
problem. Insurance against risk ex ante requires that lucky agents take action on behalf
of unlucky agents ex post, after uncertainty has been resolved. This necessitates some
mechanism to align the interests of lucky agents with those of unlucky agents. For
example, suppose that workers face risk to their labor productivity and hence their
ability to generate income for themselves. Insurance against this risk requires that high
productivity workers earn extra income that can be transferred to low productivity
workers. An income tax system that can provide this insurance thus must give high
productivity workers a reason to earn this extra income. This thesis is comprised of two
essays that consider this basic problem in two different contexts.
The first considers the use of in-kind welfare benefits in the optimal design of social
insurance programs. It takes as its point of departure an observation and conjecture of
Currie and Gahvari (2007). These authors document that a significant portion of in-kind
welfare benefits in the United States are paid out to households that do not work. They
contend that this indicates that the primary purpose of these in-kind benefits is not to
incentivize labor supply. My work builds on theirs in two ways. First, I confirm their
conjecture. In a standard model of insurance against labor productivity shocks, it is not
optimal to distort consumption decision margins for agents that do not supply labor,
which is exactly what in-kind welfare benefits do. However, I then show that, if goods
are used in home production, it is optimal to distort decision margins of agents that are
out of the labor force. Whether goods used in home production should be subsidized
1
2or taxed relative to other goods is determined by the degree of their complementarity
with labor in home production.
The second essay turns to monetary unions. With the German bailouts of Greece during
the Eurozone debt crisis in mind, I ask why, if countries form a monetary union, would
countries with low sovereign debt choose to offer bailouts to countries with high sovereign
debt. I show that, if the monetary union’s central bank cannot commit to monetary
policy, then it will be tempted to use inflation to redistribute from households in low debt
countries to households in high debt countries, as this devalues the payments the high
debt households implicitly owe low debt households. Low debt countries can forestall
this use of inflation by redistributing to high debt countries directly through bailouts.
This initial result treats the debt position of countries as exogenous. I then endogenize
the choice of nominal debt by allowing the governments of countries to borrow or save in
sovereign debt markets in response to income shocks. In general, countries that receive
favorable income shocks will save, and countries that receive bad income shocks will
borrow. Countries with good shocks thus become the low debt countries that make a
bailout payment to high debt, and thus bad shock, countries. The bailouts mimic a
risk sharing arrangement between countries from an ex ante perspective. Given that
the rationale for bailouts is the central bank’s temptation to use the monetary union’s
shared inflation rate for redistribution, the monetary union can be seen as a way for
countries to credibly commit to insure each other against shocks.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 contains the work on in-kind
welfare benefits. Chapter 3 addresses monetary unions. Chapter 4 offers concluding
remarks.
Chapter 2
In-Kind Social Insurance Benefits
and Home Production
2.1 Introduction
In-kind welfare benefits constitute a significant portion of the U.S. social safety net. In
2012, government spending on Medicare, Medicaid, SNAP (Food Stamps), and primary
and secondary education constituted 10% of GDP according to the Treasury Depart-
ment’s Greenbook, and this number has only risen with the full implementation of the
Affordable Care Act. Such welfare programs effectively subsidize the goods in which
benefits are received relative to other goods. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) and later
Saez (2002) argue that there is an efficiency reason to use such subsidies to provide
labor supply incentives if there are non-separabilities in preferences and private infor-
mation about individual preferences and labor productivity. However, as documented
in Currie and Gahvari (2007), a significant fraction of these in-kind welfare benefits are
paid out to households that do not supply labor. The single largest in-kind program in
the U.S. is Medicare, which is targeted at retirees. Many enrolled in Medicaid are also
recipients of long-term disability insurance payments. In 2012, according to the USDA,
10% of heads of household receiving SNAP benefits were over age 60. In light of these
facts, Currie and Gahvari contend that it is difficult to see the goal of these programs
as incentivizing labor supply. This chapter shows that Currie and Gahvari’s conjecture
is correct in the sense that, in a standard Mirrleesian framework, there is no efficiency
3
4reason to distort margins between goods when agents do not supply labor, even in the
presence of non-separabilities. However, I then show that by adding home production
to the standard Mirrleesian framework there is an efficiency reason for such distortions,
even when agents are not working in the market.
2.2 A Simple Mirrleesian Model
The purpose of this section is to go over a two productivity type, two good Mirrleesian
model to examine when it is optimal to distort the consumption margins of the agents. In
particular, I will show that, assuming that only the local downward incentive constraint
binds, the consumption margins of the high type are never distorted in the optimal
allocation. It may be optimal to distort the consumption margins of the low type.
However, if the optimal allocation has the low type not working, then consumption
margins for the low type will not be distorted in the optimal allocation either. This
result is generalized in the next section of this chapter. Analysis of this simple model
provides intuition for the broader result that follows in section 2.3. In particular, I
will show that the rationale for distorting the consumption margin of low types is to
take advantage of differing degrees of complementarity of different goods with leisure.
By offering an allocation for low types that “subsidizes” goods that are substitutes for
leisure and “taxes” goods that are complements to leisure, the planner can increase the
utility of honest low types more than the utility of high types claiming to be low types
because a dishonest high type consumes more leisure than an honest low type. These
distortions will thus slacken the incenitve constraint, allowing the planner to provide
higher expected utility. However, in the case of an optimal allocation where the low
type does not work, the low type and the dishonest high type consume the same amount
of leisure and this motivation for distorting the consumption margins disappears.
2.2.1 Model
There is a single time period and a continuum of agents. Each agent receives a produc-
tivity type θ ∈ {θl, θh}, where θh > θl > 0. The probability that an agent is of type θl
is given by pi ∈ (0, 1). Productivity types are private information of agents. There is
a single final good y which may transformed one for one into 2 different consumption
5goods c1 and c2. An agent of type θ may transform labor l into a quantity y of the
final good according to y = θl. The labor supply of agents is not publicly observable;
however, consumption and output are. Agents have type-independent preferences over
consumption and labor represented by the utility function U(c1, c2, l). U is assumed to
be increasing in c1 and c2 and decreasing in l. Appealing to the revelation principle,
substituting labor for output divided by productivity in the utility function, and as-
suming that only the incentive constraint of the high productivity type is binding, the
problem of an information constrained utilitarian social planner in this environment is
to choose type-specific consumption and output cθ1, c
θ
2, y
θ to solve
max
c
θl
1 ,c
θl
2 ,y
θl ,c
θh
1 ,c
θh
2 ,y
θh
piU
(
cθl1 , c
θl
2 ,
yθl
θl
)
+ (1− pi)U
(
cθh1 , c
θh
2 ,
yθh
θh
)
s.t. pi[cθl1 + c
θl
2 ] + (1− pi)[cθh1 + cθh2 ] = piyθl + (1− pi)yθht
U
(
cθh1 , c
θh
2 ,
yθh
θh
)
≥ U
(
cθl1 , c
θl
2 ,
yθl
θh
)
Let λ and µ denote the Lagrange multipliers on the resource constraint and the incentive
constraint, respectively. The first order conditions for consumption goods i = 1, 2 for
low and high θ types are given by
cθli : piUci
(
cθl1 , c
θl
2 ,
yθl
θl
)
− piλ− µUci
(
cθl1 , c
θl
2 ,
yθl
θh
)
= 0 (2.1)
cθhi : (1− pi)Uci
(
cθh1 , c
θh
2 ,
yθh
θh
)
− (1− pi)λ+ µUci
(
cθl1 , c
θl
2 ,
yθl
θh
)
= 0 (2.2)
(2.1) and (2.2) imply that marginal rates of substitution between goods in the optimal
allocation will satisfy
6Uc1(θl)
Uc2(θl)
=
1− µpi
Uc2
(
c
θl
1 ,c
θl
2 ,
yθl
θh
)
Uc2 (θl)
1− µpi
Uc1
(
c
θl
1 ,c
θl
2 ,
yθl
θh
)
Uc1 (θl)
(2.3)
Uc1(θh)
Uc2(θh)
=
1 + µ1−pi
1 + µ1−pi
= 1 (2.4)
Here, I use the notation
Uci(θ) = Uci
(
cθ1, c
θ
2,
yθ
θ
)
for θ = θh, θl. It follows from (2.4) that the consumption margin of the high type is
never distorted in the optimal allocation (the marginal rate of substitution is set equal
to the marginal rate of transformation, which in this case is 1). (2.3) implies that the
consumption margins of the low type will be distorted whenever
Uc1(θl)
Uc2(θl)
=
Uc1
(
cθl1 , c
θl
2 ,
yθl
θl
)
Uc2
(
cθl1 , c
θl
2 ,
yθl
θl
) 6= Uc1
(
cθl1 , c
θl
2 ,
yθl
θh
)
Uc2
(
cθl1 , c
θl
2 ,
yθl
θh
) (2.5)
There will be a positive distortion to the consumption margin of the low type whenever
Uc1
(
cθl1 , c
θl
2 ,
yθl
θl
)
Uc2
(
cθl1 , c
θl
2 ,
yθl
θl
) < Uc1
(
cθl1 , c
θl
2 ,
yθl
θh
)
Uc2
(
cθl1 , c
θl
2 ,
yθl
θh
) (2.6)
If yl > 0, then labor supply of an honest low type,
yl
θl
, will be higher than the labor
supply of a high type who reports a low value of θ, ylθh . Thus (2.6) implies that if an
increase in labor supply tends to decrease the marginal utility of good 2 less than the
marginal utility of good 1, then the optimal allocation will feature a positive distortion.
More succinctly, the planner should tax good 1 relative to good 2 if good 1 is more
complementary to leisure than good 2. This will harm a lying high type more than it
will harm an honest low type because the lying high type supplies less labor and therefore
enjoys more leisure. The distortion thus makes it easier to provide incentives. This sort
of motive is exactly what the weak separability condition of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976)
rules out, as separability ensures that no goods are relatively more complementary to
7leisure than others. Notice, though, that even without assuming weak separability, if
yl = 0, then (2.5) cannot hold. This implies that, if in the optimal allocation low types
supply no labor, then their consumption margin should not be distorted either. If low
types don’t work, then a true low type and a lying high type will consume the same
amount of leisure, and there is no leverage to be gained against incentives by taxing
complements to leisure.
2.3 A General Mirleesian Life Cycle Model
Section 2.2 presented a simple, static model to provide some intuition for why, in an
optimal allocation, consumption margins should not be distorted for agents that do not
work. This section extends that result to a richer dynamic model that can address
periods of labor market inactivity over the life cycle such as retirement or temporary
or permanent disability. In particular, I will show that, in the absence of very strong
time inseparability in preferences, in any period in which an agent does not work, his
consumption margins should not be distorted.
2.3.1 Environment
Time is discrete and finite, indexed by t = 0, . . . , T . The economy is populated by a
continuum of ex ante identical agents with mass 1 who work to produce output and
consume. In each period t, each agent receives a labor productivity shock θt. An agent
with labor productivity θt can use labor input lt to produce output yt according to the
linear technology yt = θtlt. θt follows a Markov process with conditional distribution
Ft(θt|θt−1) (all agents have a common seed value θ−1 for the process) and support [θ, θ]
that does not vary with time. θt is private information of the agent; however, output
and consumption are publicly observable. In each period, output yt can be transformed
one-for-one into N consumption goods {cjt}Nj=1. Output can also be transfered across
periods at a fixed interest rate R. Agents’ preferences over labor and consumption are
given by
E [U(c10, . . . , cN0, l0, . . . , c1t, . . . , cNt, lt, . . . , c1T , . . . , cNT , lT )]
where U is strictly increasing in all consumption goods, strictly decreasing in all labor
supplies, and is twice continuously differentiable.
82.3.2 Planner’s Problem
I will set up the Planner’s problem in terms of choosing a direct revelation mechanism
to minimize the time 0 resource cost of providing a given utility level U . Let θt denote a
t-length history of labor productivity shocks and Θt = [θ, θ]t be the set of all possible t-
length histories. An allocation rule is a set of functions {{cjt}Nj=1, yt}Tt=0 where cjt : Θt →
R+ and yt : Θt → R+ are Borel measurable. A reporting strategy is a set of measurable
functions {σt}Tt=0 where σt : Θt → [θ, θ]. Any reporting strategy implies a set of reported
history functions {σt}Tt=0 where σt : Θt → Θt is given by σt(θt) = (σ0(θt0), . . . , σt(θtt)).
In what follows, I will ignore time subscripts where it will not cause confusion. Define
an agent’s utility from an allocation rule {{cj}, y} as
U({{cj}, y}) =
E
[
U(c10(θ
0), . . . , cN0(θ
0),
y0(θ
0)
θ0
, . . . , c1T (θ
T ), . . . , cNT (θ
T ),
yT (θ
T )
θT
)|θ−1
]
and an agent’s utility from a reporting strategy σ given an allocation rule {{cj}, y} as
Uσ({{cj}, y}) = E
[
U
(
c10(σ
0(θ0)), . . . , cN0(σ
0(θ0)),
y0(σ
0(θ0))
θ0
, . . .
c1T (σ
T (θT )), . . . cNT (σ
T (θT )),
yT (σ
T (θT ))
θT
)
| θ−1
]
An allocation rule is incentive compatible if
U({{cj}, y}) ≥ Uσ({{cj}, y}) ∀ σ
Note that if σ is the truthful reporting strategy (i.e. σt(θ
t) = θt), then U({{cj}, y}) =
Uσ({{cj}, y}), thus this requires the optimality of truth telling. Finally, an allocation
rule satisfies promise keeping if
U({{cj}, y}) ≥ U
I can now formulate the planner’s problem, which is given by:
9min
{{cj},y}
T∑
t=0
R−t
∫ θ
θ
. . .
∫ θ
θ
 N∑
j=1
cjt(θ
t)− yt(θt)
 dFt(θt|θt−1) . . . dF0(θ0|θ−1)
s.t. U ({{cj}, y}) ≥ U
U ({{cj}, y}) ≥ Uσ ({{cj}, y}) ∀ σ (PP)
Assumption 1. The expected utility function U is weakly time separable, i.e. ∃ real-
valued functions {Gt}Tt=0 and V s.t.
U(c10, . . . , cN0, l0, . . . , c1T , . . . , cNT , lT ) =
V (G0(c10, . . . , cN0, l0), . . . , GT (c1T , . . . , cNT , lT ))
Notice that Assumption 1 is satisfied by recursive prefernces such as Epstein Zin as well
as by more conventional utility functions that are additively separable in time. I can
now state the main result of section 2.3.
Theorem 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds and {{c∗j}, y∗} is a solution to (PP). Then
for almost every history θt s.t. y∗t (θt) = 0 consumption margins are not distorted in θt,
i.e.
Gt,i(θ
t)
Gt,j(θt)
= 1 ∀ i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}
The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in the appendix. This confirms the conjecture of
Currie and Gahvari (2007): a standard Mirrleesian model does not provide an efficiency
reason for distortions to consumption margins for agents that do not work.
2.4 A Simple Mirrleesian Model with Home Production
The issue with the standard Mirrleesian life cycle model of the previous section is that, in
the absence of very strong assumptions of time inseparability, it can’t deliver distortions
to consumption margins during periods in which an agent is not working. This implies it
cannot justify the in-kind benefits received by retirees and people on long-term disability
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under the U.S. social insurance system. To reiterate the analysis of section 2.2, the
reason for this is that consumption margins should only be distorted when honest agents
and dishonest agents consume different amounts of leisure, in order to take advantage
of differing degrees of complementarity. In this section, I will show that introducing
home production in a simple Mirrleesian model can break down this result. The home
production model is isomorphic to a Mirrleesian model with type dependent preferences.
MRS can thus vary across types as in Saez (2002), even when agents do not work. This
is true even if the underlying preferences of agents are additively separable, as I show
in an example in section 2.4.2.
2.4.1 Model
There are again two productivity types: θh and θl, with θh > θl > 0. There is a
single market output good y. An agents with type θ produces y with market labor lθm
according to y = θlm. y can be transformed one for one into two consumption goods:
cf and ci. cf is consumed directly by agents. Agents combine home labor l
θ
h and ci to
produce a home good ch according to ch = f(ci, θl
θ
h). Preferences are represented by
the utility function v(cf , ch, lm, lh). Market output y, and consumption of the market
goods cf and ci are observable to the planner. Home production and productivity are
not. It is convenient to define a type dependent indirect utility functions over market
quantities
uθ(cf , ci, lm) = max
lh
v(cf , f(ci, θlh), lm, lh) (2.7)
It follows from the envelope theorem that the marginal rate of substitution between cf
and ci for the indirect utility function is given by
uθcf
uθci
=
vcf
vchfci
(2.8)
The utilitarian planner’s problem can be formulated in terms of the indirect utility
functions. Applying the revelation priniciple, substituting market output divided by
productivity for market labor, and assuming that only the incentive constraint of the
high type is binding, the planner’s problem is given by
11
max
c
θl
f ,c
θl
i ,y
θl ,c
θh
f ,c
θh
i ,y
θh
piuθl
(
cθlf , c
θl
i ,
yθl
θl
)
+ (1− pi)uθh
(
cθhf , c
θh
i ,
yθh
θh
)
s.t. pi[cθlf + c
θl
i ] + (1− pi)[cθhf + cθhi ] = piyθl + (1− pi)yθh
uθh
(
cθhf , c
θh
i ,
yθh
θh
)
≥ uθh
(
cθlf , c
θl
i ,
yθl
θh
)
(2.9)
Very similarly to the model in section 2.2, the MRS between cf and ci for the high θ
type in the optimal allocation will satisfy
uθhc1t(θh)
uθhc2t(θh)
= 1 (2.10)
and for the low θ type will satisfy
uθlcf (θl)
uθlci(θl)
=
1− µpi
uθ
h
ci
(
c
θl
f ,c
θl
i ,
yθl
θh
)
u
θl
ci
(θl)
1− µpi
uθhcf
(
c
θl
f ,c
θl
i ,
yθl
θh
)
u
θl
cf
(θl)
(2.11)
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier on the incentive constraint. Again, (2.10) implies
the consumption margin will not be distorted for high types in an optimal allocation,
and, by (2.11), that of the low type will be distorted if and only if
uθlcf (θl)
uθlci(θl)
6=
uθhcf
(
cθlf , c
θl
i ,
yθl
θh
)
uθhci
(
cθlf , c
θl
i ,
yθl
θh
) (2.12)
Notice that the functions on the left and the right hand side of (2.12) are no longer
identical, as they were in (2.5). This implies that the inequality can hold even if the
arguments of the functions on the left and right hand side are identical. The result of
section 2.2 no longer necessarily goes through. In what follows, I will give an example
where it explicitly does not.
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2.4.2 Example for Home Production Model
Suppose that the utility function v(cf , ch, lm, lh) has the form
v(cf , ch, lm, lh) = log(cf ) + log(ch)− α(lm + lh)
where α > 0 is a constant, and the home production function f has the form
f(ci, θlh) =
{
γc
σ−1
σ
i + (1− γ)(θlh)
σ−1
σ
} σ
σ−1
where γ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 0. With these preferences, for a given quantity of ci, an agent
of type θ will choose time spent in home production to satisfy the first order condition
(1− γ)(θlh)σ−1σ
γc
σ−1
σ
i + (1− γ)(θlh)
σ−1
σ
× 1
lh
= α (2.13)
This first order condition leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Let lh(θ) denote the solution to (2.13). Then θ× lh(θ) is increasing in
θ for θ > 0.
Proof. Let θ1 > θ2 > 0, and let l˜h(θ1) be such that θ1 l˜h(θ1) = θ2lh(θ2). Define the
function
Φ(θlH) =
(1− γ)(θlh)σ−1σ
γc
σ−1
σ
i + (1− γ)(θlh)
σ−1
σ
Notice that the left hand side of (2.13) can be written as
Φ(θlH)× 1
lH
Next, note that, because θ1 > θ2, it follows that l˜h(θ1) < lh(θ2). This implies that
Φ(θ1 l˜h(θ1))
1
l˜h(θ1)
= Φ(θ2lh(θ2))
1
l˜h(θ1)
> Φ(θ2lh(θ2))
1
lh(θ2)
= α
Here, the first equality follows from the definition of l˜H(θ1) and the second equality from
the definition of lh(θ). Note next that the left hand side of (2.13) is decreasing in lH
(this follows immediately from the concavity of the natural log and the CES production
function f). Then given that
Φ(θ1 l˜h(θ1))
1
l˜h(θ1)
> α
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it must be the case that lh(θ1) > l˜h(θ1), hence
θ1lh(θ1) > θ1 l˜h(θ1) = θ2lh(θ2)
Then because θ1 and θ2 were arbitrary, this completes the proof.
Proposition 1 establishes that, in the optimal allocation that solves the planner’s prob-
lem (2.9), a high type who claims to be a low type will choose to supply more effective
labor in home production than an honest low type. As in the standard Mirrleesian model
of section 2.2, the consumption margin between final goods cf and and intermediate
consumption goods ci for the low type in the optimal allocation will satisfy
uθlcf (θl)
uθlci(θl)
≷ 1
if and only if
uθlcf (θl)
uθlci(θl)
≶
uθhcf
(
cθlf , c
θl
i ,
yθl
θh
)
uθhci
(
cθlf , c
θl
i ,
yθl
θh
)
Then, by (2.8), this will hold if and only
γ(cθli )
σ−1
σ + (1− γ)(θllh(θl))σ−1σ
cθlf
× (cθli )
1
σ ≶
γ(cθli )
σ−1
σ + (1− γ)(θhlh(θh))σ−1σ
cθlf
× (cθli )
1
σ
Finally, as per Proposition 1, θhlh(θh) > θllh(θl), hence this will be satisfied if and only
if σ ≷ 1. Summing up
uθlcf (θl)
uθlci(θl)
≷ 1⇔ σ ≷ 1 (2.14)
The parameter σ is the elasticity of technical substitution between goods and effective
labor in home production. Goods are substitutes for labor in production if σ > 1 and
complements if σ < 1. The interpretation of this condition is that high types in essence
have more labor to use in home production because of their higher productivity. A tax
on goods for home production for low types will thus be more painful for high types
than for low types if goods are complements to labor in production and is an efficient
way to provide incentives. A subsidy on goods for home production for low types will
14
be more beneficial for low types than for dishonest high types if goods are substitutes
for labor in production, and thus provides a cheap way of increasing the utility of low
types. Notice, though, that the analysis above in no way depends on yθlm. The sign
distortion to the MRS of low types is determined entirely by σ. Hence even if yθlm = 0 in
the optimal allocation and the low type does not work in the market, there will be either
marginal taxation or subsidization of intermediate goods for home production relative
to final goods. A Mirrleesian model with home production can thus provide an efficiency
reason for in-kind welfare benefits during retirement and periods of disability. This is
nice for two reasons. First, there is a substantial literature following Aguiar and Hurst
(2005) that argues that some form of home production that uses labor and goods as input
is a significant explanatory factor in the behavior of life cycle consumption patterns. It
is thus of independent interest to examine optimal taxation and social insurance design
in a model that includes this feature. Second, in-kind welfare benefits in the U.S. seem
to subsidize goods that are used in home production (unprepared food through SNAP,
home energy through energy assistance programs, housing through Section 8) relative
to goods that are consumed directly, which is the margin the Mirrleesian model with
home production predicts should be distorted.
Chapter 3
Bailouts, Inflation, and Risk
Sharing in Monetary Unions
3.1 Introduction
Since 2008, thinking on the Euro has been inseparably linked to the ongoing Greek
debt crisis and the various bailout programs implemented by the Troika. Greece is
not unique among countries that have suffered sovereign debt crises in receiving for-
eign aid; however, as argued and documented by Bulow and Rogoff (2015), the scale
of this aid is. Moreover, the governments of other Eurozone members (especially Ger-
many) directly participated in these bailouts, providing rescue funds, as well as the
bond purchases and political muscle required for domestic participation in the PSI
write off. These governments also acted indirectly through the European Commission
and the European Central Bank, all of which reinforces the idea that there is something
special about the role of the Euro in these bailouts. Although there is an intuitive
appeal to connect the Euro and the Greek bailouts, the exact nature of this relation-
ship has been elusive. Why would a country like Germany, with a stable economy
and low sovereign debt, agree to rescue Greece just because the two share a currency?
This chapter explores a novel mechanism that rationalizes bailouts of high debt mem-
bers of a monetary union by low debt members. The incentive for bailouts stems from
a commitment problem in monetary policy. I construct a model where the central
bank will be tempted ex post to use surprise inflation to devalue sovereign debt, as
15
16
this will redistribute from low debt countries to high debt countries. Fiscal author-
ities in low debt countries will rationally choose to engage in redistribution through
bailouts as this will forestall redistribution through inflation and the distortions that
such redistribution entails. Fiscal authorities in the model issue debt to smooth shocks
to their economies. This implies that countries with high debt are countries that
have been unlucky, and low debt countries have been lucky. Bailouts redistribute
from the lucky to the unlucky, so they function as a sort of risk sharing between the
union members and improve the welfare of households from an ex ante perspective.
This risk sharing raises the specter of moral hazard. Countries might over-borrow if
they anticipate receiving a bailout, leading to higher nominal debt and consequently
higher inflation. However, in equilibrium, although countries will borrow more relative
to an environment in which bailouts are not allowed, they will increase their borrowing
less than one for one with the size of the bailout. Intuitively, there is a permanent
income-like response. If a fiscal authority believes it will be bailed out in the future,
it will want to increase consumption in its country in both the current period and in
the future. It accomplishes the former by increasing its borrowing; it accomplishes the
latter by limiting that borrowing increase. This implies that bailouts will work to re-
duce inequality between countries, which tempers the central bank’s incentive to inflate.
Interestingly, the opportunity for risk sharing provides a new theory as to why coun-
tries might choose to form a monetary union in the first place. The monetary union
acts as a commitment mechanism that allows countries to engage in a beneficial risk
sharing arrangement. The incentives required for countries to make a positive payment
after a good shock are provided by the threat of surprise inflation if they renege. The
same forces that give rise to risk sharing in the monetary union, namely nominally de-
nominated debt and lack of commitment in monetary policy, also create a well-known
free-rider problem. In such an environment, fiscal authorities tend to over-issue nominal
debt because they do not internalize the costs of the surprise inflation this imposes on
other members of the union. Countries will necessarily trade off the costs of a free-rider
problem and the benefits of risk sharing. I present an example to show that it is possible
for risk sharing to dominate this trade off. Given that the benefit to forming a monetary
union is access to risk sharing, countries stand to gain more from forming a monetary
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union if the shocks they face are less correlated. This is a counterpoint to the classic anal-
ysis of the effects of cross-country correlation of shocks, wherein countries with highly
correlated shocks have similar monetary policy needs and face the lowest cost of sharing
policy.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a literature review.
Section 3 presents the base line model in 2 steps. First, it introduces a static model in
which countries are exogenously creditors or debtors. I use the static model to show
that if debtor countries owe creditors a sufficiently large payment, creditors will agree
to bailout debtors by forgiving some of their bonds. I then embed the static model into
a dynamic model in which countries’ asset positions are determined endogenously and
show that bailouts improve the welfare of households in the monetary union ex ante
through risk sharing and a decrease in inflation. In Section 4, the model is extended to
discuss the results on optimal currency areas. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
The analysis contained in this chapter contributes to several strands of literature. The
first is recent work on sovereign debt and asset markets in monetary unions. Chari and
Kehoe (2007, 2008) consider the free-rider problem that arises in a monetary union when
countries issue nominal debt and the central bank cannot credibly promise to avoid sur-
prise inflation. Their analysis focuses on the possibility of solving this free rider problem
through restrictions on fiscal policy, such as the debt constraints of Maastricht Treaty.
Here, I show how the same factors that give rise to their free-rider problem also provide
incentives for risk sharing between countries. Aguiar et al. (2013) also discuss an envi-
ronment in which member countries of a monetary union issue nominal debt and there
is a commitment problem in monetary policy. In their environment, countries face the
risk of a debt crisis. If lenders believe the central bank will devalue the union’s currency
in the event of a crisis to prevent a default, they will not run on the bonds of high debt
members and a crisis will not occur. The union needs a sufficiently large number of high
debt members for the central bank to agree to inflate in the event of a crisis. However,
if there are too many high debt members the central bank will also inflate even if there
isn’t a crisis. There is thus an interior solution for the optimal debt distribution from
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the perspective high debt members. I also consider the ability of the debt distribution to
act as a disciplinary tool in a monetary union. In their work, it provides the incentives
for action in the face of a crisis and tempered policy in normal times; in mine, it enforces
payments in a risk sharing arrangement. Farhi and Werning (2012) show that mone-
tary unions give rise to an externality in asset markets. In a monetary union, private
agents tend to under insure themselves, as they do not internalize how by insuring them-
selves, they decrease the heterogeneity in the monetary policy needs of the members
of the union. The purchase of insurance augments monetary policy’s ability to smooth
asymmetric shocks across countries. This externalilty can be addressed by fiscal policy
coordination at the union level. I see their work as extremely complementary to mine.
They show how a monetary union creates a demand for more insurance, and I show how
a monetary union creates the incentives required for more insurance to be provided.
The paper most closely related to my work here is that of Chari et al. (2016a). They
also consider the possibility that members of a monetary union might engage in bailouts
to avert redistributive action. They show that the threat of action by the central bank
leads countries to anticipate higher bailouts and issue more real debt, a result that also
obtains in my environment. However, their analysis assumes linear utility and does not
focus on ex ante welfare, and thus abstracts from the consumption smoothing and risk
sharing effects that are key to my welfare results.
This chapter also makes a contribution to the optimal currency area literature, in par-
ticular the strand that focuses on the correlation of income shocks of the potential
members of the monetary union. The classical analysis of this issue originated in Fried-
man (1958) and was further elaborated on in Mundell (1961). This work takes as given
that there are shocks which require that action be taken by the monetary authority.
If countries experience drastically different shocks, then they will have drastically dif-
ferent policy needs and hence forming a monetary union will be costly. This implies
that countries whose shocks are more highly correlated benefit the most from forming a
monetary union. Two lines of contemporary work rebut this point. The first, following
Frankel and Rose (1998) considers the potential endogeneity of the criteria laid out
in the Friedman-Mundell logic. This literature uses structural models to estimate the
effects of fixed exchange rate regimes (usually the Euro) on the correlation of macroe-
conomic variables of the countries involved. It does not seek to counter the essence of
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the Friedman-Mundell argument, but augment it by showing that, if countries form a
monetary union, their economies will integrate and shocks to which monetary policy
should respond will become more positively correlated. Countries that might not seem
like an optimal currency area ex ante become an optimal currency area ex post. The
second counter is that Friedman-Mundell assumes commitment to monetary policy. If
there are shocks to which monetary policy ought not respond ex ante but will ex post
because of a temptation for surprise inflation, as in Barro and Gordon (1983), then
countries with less correlated shocks stand to gain from forming a monetary union,
as the monetary authority in a union simply will not be able to respond to all of the
individual shocks, temptation or not. Friedman (1973) and Alesina and Barro (2001)
discuss this effect in the context of dollarization, in which a country effectively adopts
the currency of another whose central bank does not weight its welfare and will not
respond to its temptation shocks. Chari et al. (2016b) extend this analysis to an envi-
ronment in which the central cares about all countries. For an excellent survey of the
both the classical and contemporary literature on optimal currency areas, see Dellas and
Tavlas (2009). I see my work as a third alternative for a counterweight to the original
Friedman-Mundell logic. Less correlated shocks allow for more risk sharing, which is
the benefit of monetary unions I seek to highlight here.
3.3 Model
In this section, I introduce a model of a monetary union with bailouts. I proceed with
this exposition in two steps. First, I present a static model of a monetary union in which
the nominal asset positions of countries are determined exogenously. I use this static
model to show how bailouts and the inflation rate are determined given nominal asset
positions. Next, I embed this static model as the second period of a dynamic model
in which the asset positions of countries are determined endogenously. I then use the
dynamic model to derive the first key result of the current chapter, that allowing for
bailouts improves the ex ante welfare of the members of the monetary union.
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3.3.1 Static Model
There is a continuum of countries of measure 1, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] that form a
monetary union. Each country is populated by a fiscal authority and a representative
household. I follow Aguiar et al. (2013) and assume that the representative household
has preferences over a single consumption good c and the union-wide inflation rate pi
represented by a separable utility function
u(c)− ψ(pi)
where u : R++ → R and ψ : R+ → R. The fiscal authority acts to maximize the utility
of the representative household in its country. The function ψ is meant to capture the
distorting effects of inflation. The inflation rate pi is set by the monetary union’s central
bank. The inflation rate represents the growth rate of the price level between the time
period of the static model and some previous period, not included in the static model.
Normalizing the price level in this previous period to one, the price level in the static
model is just the gross inflation rate 1 + pi.
All countries receive a common, deterministic endowment of the consumption good y.
Fraction 12 of these countries are debtor countries, and the remaining fraction are creditor
countries. The fiscal authority in each debtor country must make a nominal payment
equal to B, and the fiscal authority in each creditor country is owed a nominal payment
equal to B.1 Fiscal authorities in debtor countries finance their payments with a lump
sum tax on the endowments of their respective households, and the payments received
by the fiscal authorities in creditor countries are rebated to their households through a
lump sum transfer. The timing of the model is as follows:
1. Countries receive their endowments y.
2. Fiscal authorities in creditor countries collectively offer a bailout to debtor coun-
tries. As in Chari et al. (2016a), this bailout takes the form of an offer of debt
forgiveness of some amount ∆. Each creditor country will receive a nominal pay-
ment of B − ∆ and each debtor country will make a nominal payment equal to
B −∆.
1 I think of B as being positive, and indeed B is assumed to be positive in the statement of the
results of the static model. However, I will will allow B to be negative in order to extend the domain
of the functions that constitute an equilibrium of the static model.
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3. Debtor countries collectively choose to accept or reject the bailout. If debtor
countries reject the bailout, then ∆ = 0 and no debt is forgiven.
4. The central bank sets the inflation rate pi.
5. Nominal payments are made and consumption takes place.
The consumption of households in creditor countries, denoted cH , is given by
cH = y +
B −∆
1 + pi
and the consumption of households in debtor countries, denoted cL, is given by
cL = y − B −∆
1 + pi
In the next section, I will define and characterize the equilibrium of the static model.
3.3.2 Equilibrium of the Static Model
Equilibrium in the static model will consist of two objects: an inflation rate and a
bailout. I begin with the problem of the central bank, which determines the inflation
rate. The central bank chooses the inflation rate after the bailout ∆ has been deter-
mined.2 The central bank acts to maximize the utilitarian welfare of the households
in the monetary union. The central bank’s choice of the inflation rate is restricted by
non-negativity constraints for consumption and a no-deflation constraint pi ≥ 0. Im-
plicitly, deflation is assumed to be sufficiently costly that the central bank would never
choose to engage in it. The central bank’s problem is then
max
pi
1
2
[
u
(
y +
B −∆
1 + pi
)
− ψ(pi)
]
+
1
2
[
u
(
y − B −∆
1 + pi
)
− ψ(pi)
]
s.t. pi ≥ 0
cH , cL ≥ 0 (3.1)
2 This formulation of the central bank’s problem implicitly assumes that the central bank cannot
commit to monetary policy before bailouts are determined, and hence does not try to discipline the
choice of ∆
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where cH = y+
B−∆
1+pi and cL = y− B−∆1+pi . Let pi(B,∆) denote the solution to the central
bank’s problem.
Assuming that the non-negativity constraints of this problem don’t bind, the central
bank’s first order condition is given by
1
2
B −∆
(1 + pi)2
[
u′
(
y − B −∆
1 + pi
)
− u′
(
y +
B −∆
1 + pi
)]
= ψ′(pi) (3.2)
The right-hand side of (3.2) is the marginal cost of inflation from the perspective of the
central bank, which is just the marginal disutility of inflation. The left-hand side repre-
sents the marginal benefit of inflation, which is its marginal effect on reducing inequality
in the utility of consumption between debtor and creditor countries. As inflation rises,
the real values of payments of debtors to creditors B−∆1+pi falls and consumption is redis-
tributed from creditors to debtors. Equation (3.2) makes it clear that the central bank’s
policy will tradeoff the benefits of redistribution and the distorting costs of inflation.
Next, I turn to the decision of debtor countries to accept or reject a bailout offer ∆.
When making this decision, debtor countries will anticipate the actions of the central
bank. Their welfare from accepting a bailout of ∆ can then be written as a function
UL(B,∆) = u
(
y − B −∆
1 + pi(B,∆)
)
− ψ(pi(B,∆))
Debtor countries will accept the bailout if and only if3
UL(B,∆) ≥ UL(B, 0)
Finally, I turn to the creditor countries’ choice of the bailout. Creditor countries are
not allowed to use the bailout to increase the nominal repayment of debtor countries,
hence they will face a non-negativity constraint ∆ ≥ 0.4 Creditors will make this
choice anticipating the decision of debtor countries and the central bank’s policy. They
3 I show later that this participation constraint of debtor countries never binds in the solution to
the creditors’ bailout problem. However, I have to entertain the possibility that debtors would reject
bailouts because, in general, bailouts decrease the inflation rate and could potentially increase the
real value of the repayment debtors must make. Also, note that this formulation of the participation
constraint implicitly assumes that debtor countries cannot commit to reject bailouts to try to discipline
creditors’ offers.
4 Proposition 3 implies that debtor countries would reject any bailout ∆ < 0
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will choose ∆ to solve
max
∆
u
(
y +
B −∆
1 + pi(B,∆)
)
− ψ(pi(B,∆))
s.t. UD(B,∆) ≥ UD(B, 0)
∆ ≥ 0 (3.3)
Let ∆(B) denote the solution to this problem. With the central bank’s problem (3.1)
and the bailout problem (3.3) stated, I can define equilibrium for the static model.
Definition. An equilibrium of the static model is a pair of functions ∆ : R→ R+ and
pi : R× R+ → R+ such that
i.) pi(B,∆) solves the central bank’s problem (3.1) ∀ levels of nominal bonds B and
bailouts ∆
ii.) ∆(B) solves the bailout problem (3.3) for all values of B given pi(B,∆)
I will begin the characterization of the equilibrium of the static model with some stan-
dard assumptions on the utility functions u and ψ. In particular, I will assume that u is
strictly increasing, strictly concave, with a convex derivative; that u satisfies the Inada
conditions; and that ψ is strictly increasing and convex, with a first derivative such that
ψ′(0) = 0. I summarize these assumptions below
Assumption 2. The functions u and ψ satisfy
i.) u is C3, u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, u′′′ ≥ 0
ii.) lim
c→0
u′(c) =∞ and lim
c→∞ u
′(c) = 0.
iii.) ψ is C2, ψ′(pi) ≥ 0, with equality if and only if pi = 0,ψ′′ ≥ 0
With these assumption in place, I can state the first result of the static model
Proposition 2. Suppose that u and ψ satisfy the conditions of assumption 1. Then
i.) There is a unique function pi(B,∆) that solves the central bank’s problem.
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ii.) ∀ B > 0 and ∆ ∈ [0, B] ∂pi∂∆ ≤ 0 with equality only if ∆ = B, i.e. inflation is
decreasing in the size of the bailout
iii.) If ∆ ∈ [0, B), the real value of debt repayment B−∆1+pi(B,∆) is decreasing in ∆.
The proof of proposition 1 can be found in the appendix, but ii.) is readily apparent
from the central bank’s first order condition (3.2). The marginal benefit of inflation for
the central bank consists of two terms: the difference in marginal utilities
u′
(
y − B −∆
1 + pi
)
− u′
(
y +
B −∆
1 + pi
)
which captures the need for redistribution, and the term
1
2
B −∆
(1 + pi)2
which determines the magnitude of the redistribution that inflation achieves and is pro-
portional to B −∆. An increase in the size of the bailout will thus decrease both the
need for redistribution by reducing the spread in marginal utilities, as well as the effi-
cacy of inflation as a tool for redistribution, lowering the marginal benefit of inflation.
The central bank then responds by decreasing the inflation rate. This result highlights
the motive for creditors to engage in bailouts: redistribution through bailouts prevents
redistribution through inflation. Part iii.) shows the cost of bailouts for creditor coun-
tries, namely the real value of the repayment they receive decreases as the size of the
bailout increases. The next proposition establishes some properties of the solution to
the bailout problem ∆(B)
Proposition 3. Suppose that u and ψ satisfy the conditions of assumption 1. Then
i.) The solution to the bailout problem (3.3) satisfies ∆(B) ≤ B
ii.) If ∆ ∈ [0, B], the participation constraint of debtor countries holds with equality
⇔ ∆ = 0.
Proposition 2 implies that debtor countries will never reject bailouts. Creditor countries
will use bailouts to tradeoff the loss of consumption through decreases in the real value
of the payment they receive and decreases in the distortions from inflation. Notice that
the costs of distortionary taxation potentially required to finance bailouts are absent
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from this margin. The model implicitly assumes that these costs are small relative to
the distortions associated with inflation. This will be true if bailouts take the form of
debt forgiveness, which is the interpretation I take here. Such bailouts do not require
additional tax revenue, and hence further tax distortions, to finance. Moreover, given
that bailouts in the form of debt forgiveness constitute a substantial portion of the
Second Economic Adjustment Program for Greece, restricting attention to bailouts in
the form of debt forgiveness still allows the model to address a significant amount of
what was observed during the Eurozone debt crisis.
To obtain a sharper characterization of the solution to the bailout problem ∆(B), I will
make further assumptions on the the functions u and ψ.
Assumption 3. The functions u and ψ satisfy
i.) ψ′(pi)(1 + pi) is concave
ii.) u′′′ is non-increasing.
Condition i.) restricts the marginal cost of inflation not to increase too quickly. It will
be satisfied by a linear disutility of inflation, as in Aguiar et al. (2013). Assumption 2
implies the final result for the static model
Proposition 4. Suppose that u and ψ satisfy the conditions of assumptions 1 and 2.
Then the equilibrium bailout function ∆(B) is unique and has the form
∆(B) =
0 B ≤ B¯B − B¯ B > B¯
for some B¯ ∈ (0,∞)
Proposition 3 establishes that if the initial nominal payment owed by debtor countries
to creditor countries B is sufficiently large, then creditor countries will find it optimal
to make a strictly positive bailout. Moreover, there is an optimal value of the nominal
payment that debtors make to creditors, B¯. Creditor countries will reduce the nominal
payment to B¯ whenever B > B¯, and the non-negativity constraint for bailouts will
bind whenever B < B¯. The role of assumption 2 in obtaining this result is to guarantee
that, as the creditor countries reduce the real repayment they receive by making bailouts,
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these reductions have an ever-diminishing effect on the inflation rate, hence the marginal
benefit of the inflation reduction must decrease until it is eventually equal to 0. This
implies the existence of an optimal repayment from the perspective of creditors. I now
move onto the analysis of a dynamic model in which nominal debt and repayments are
determined endogenously. The dynamic model will have two periods: a first period in
which countries either buy or sell nominal bonds in response to income shocks, and a
second period, in which bailouts and inflation are determined as in the static model.
3.3.3 Dynamic Model
The environment for the dynamic model is as follows. There are two time periods
indexed by t = 1, 2. There is a continuum of countries of mass 1, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1],
that form a monetary union. Each country consists of a representative household and
a fiscal authority.
The representative household in country i has preferences over consumption of a single
good in periods 1 and 2, as well as the inflation rate between periods 1 and 2, represented
by the expected utility function
E[u(c1i) + β[u(c2i)− ψ(pi)]]
where c1i and c2i a consumption in periods 1 and 2, respectively, and pi is the union-wide
inflation rate.
The fiscal authority in each country is benevolent and seeks to maximize the utility of
its country’s representative household. Fiscal authority’s buy or sell nominal bonds in a
competitive market in period 1, financing purchases through a lump sum tax on house-
holds and distributing the revenues of bond sales to households through a lump sum
transfer. The monetary union is a closed economy, so the market for bonds must clear
in equilibrium. In period 2, fiscal authorities engage in bailouts, repay nominal bonds
and collect payments, financing payments through lump sum taxation and distributing
payments collected through lump sum transfers.
There is also a central bank, which conducts monetary policy by setting the inflation
rate pi in period 2. The central bank cannot commit to monetary policy.
In period 1, all countries receive a stochastic endowment of the period 1 consumption
good y1i, which can take one of two values: yH = y +  or yL = y −  for some  > 0.
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Realizations of y1i are iid across countries, and the distribution of the shocks is given
by
y1i =
yH = y +  Prob.
1
2
yL = y −  Prob. 12
In period 2, all countries receive a common, deterministic endowment y. Timing for the
dynamic model is as follows:
Period 1
1. Countries realize their endowment shocks.
2. The bond market opens. The price of nominal bonds is q, and fiscal authorities
choose their bond positions.
3. Period 1 consumption occurs. Consumption in country i is given by
c1i =
y + − qbi y1i = yHy − + qbi y1i = yL
Period 2
1. Countries receive their endowment y.
2. High endowment countries collectively offer a bailout to a low endowment coun-
tries. This bailout takes the form of an offer to forgive some amount ∆ ≥ 0 of the
face value of the debt of all countries that received a low endowment shock.
3. Low endowment countries then collectively choose to accept or reject the bailout.
If the bailout is rejected, then ∆ = 0.
4. The central bank sets the inflation rate pi, taking the bailout and the bond posi-
tions of countries as given.
5. Bond payments are made and received.
6. Period 2 consumption occurs.
c2i =
y +
bi−∆
1+pi y1i = yH
y − bi−∆1+pi y1i = yL
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Note that I write consumption as if countries with high endowments purchase bonds
and countries with low endowments sell bonds. This will be the case in equilibrium,
but here it is a notational convenience. I allow bi to be negative for either value of
the shock. This would correspond to a sale of bonds by high endowment countries
and a purchase of bonds by low endowment countries. The formulation for period 2
consumption normalizes the price level in period 1 to 1, so that the price level in period
2 is the gross inflation rate 1 + pi. I follow Chari and Kehoe (2016) in the requirement
that the value of ∆ is common for all high and low endowment countries, regardless of
an individual country’s choice of its nominal bond position. They provide a justification
for this assumption which, in essence, states that such symmetric treatment is optimal if
monitoring sovereign debt is costly and imperfect. This seems reasonable in the context
of this model, considering the ease with which the Greek government concealed the true
value of its debt in the run-up to the Eurozone crisis.
3.3.4 Bailouts and Inflation in the Dynamic Model
In a symmetric equilibrium, the fiscal authorities in all countries that receive a high
endowment shock in the first period will purchase an identical amount of nominal bonds
BH and the fiscal authorities in all countries that received a low endowment shock will
sell an amount of bonds BL. Since the monetary union is a closed economy, it follows
that BH = BL = B. Given a bailout of ∆ and a value of B, the central bank will choose
pi to solve
max
pi
1
2
[
u
(
y +
B −∆
1 + pi
)
− ψ(pi)
]
+
1
2
[
u
(
y − B −∆
1 + pi
)
− ψ(pi)
]
s.t. pi ≥ 0
cH , cL ≥ 0
where cH = y+
B−∆
1+pi and cL = y− B−∆1+pi . This is identical to the central bank’s problem
in the static model (3.1), and its solution will coincide with that of the static model, i.e.
the central bank will set pi = pi(B,∆) in response to a bailout of ∆ for a given value of
bond holdings B. Given that low endowment countries and high endowment countries
will anticipate the same policy response from the central bank as in the static model,
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the bailout chosen will be the same as the bailout chosen in the static model, i.e. for a
given value of bond holdings B, the value of the bailout in the dynamic model will be
∆(B).
3.3.5 Equilibrium of the Dynamic Model
In the first period, fiscal authorities will take the price of nominal bonds q as given and
they will anticipate B, the quantity of nominal bonds purchased by the representative
fiscal authority in high endowment countries and the quantity of nominal bonds sold
by the representative fiscal authority in low endowment countries. Given the value of
B, they will also anticipate the value of the bailout ∆(B) and the value of the inflation
rate pi(B,∆(B)).
If country i receives the high endowment shock yH = y + , the fiscal authority will
choose bi to solve
max
bi
u(y + − qbi) + β
[
u
(
y +
bi −∆(B)
1 + pi(B,∆(B))
)
− ψ(pi(B,∆(B)))
]
(3.4)
Note that the solution to this problem depends only on q and B, and not on i. Denote
this solution as bh(q,B).Similarly, if country i receives the low endowment shock yL =
y − , the fiscal authority will choose bi to solve
max
bi
u(y − + qbi) + β
[
u
(
y − bi −∆(B)
1 + pi(B,∆(B))
)
− ψ(pi(B,∆(B)))
]
(3.5)
Again, the solution of this problem will depend only on B and q, and not on i. Denote
the solution to this problem as bL(q,B). With the functions bH and bL defined, I can
define equilibrium for the dynamic model.
Definition. An equilibrium of the dynamic model is a set of functions bH : R++×R→
R, bL : R++ × R → R, pi : R × R+ → R+, and ∆ : R → R+ as well as values for the
price of nominal bonds q∗ and the representative nominal bond position B∗ such that
i.) pi(B,∆) and ∆(B) are an equilibrium of the static model
ii.) Given pi and ∆, bH(q,B) solves (3.4) and bL(q,B) solves (3.5)
iii.) q∗ and B∗ satisfy the fixed point condition bH(q∗, B∗) = bL(q∗, B∗) = B∗
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In the setup of the dynamic model and the definition of equilibrium, I glossed over
where the objective function and constraints of the bailout problem come from, and
why they do not change when individual countries deviate from the equilibrium path,
choosing bi 6= B. I show in the appendix that the bailout problem derives from a model
in which bailouts are determined through majority voting. In the voting model, the
bailout is chosen to maximize the utility of the high endowment fiscal authority that
buys the median quantity of nominal bonds in the first period, and the bailout will not
be rejected if the low endowment country that sells the median quantity of bonds in
the first period prefers the offered bailout to no bailout. In a symmetric equilibrium,
the representative fiscal authority’s bond position B is the median of the distribution of
both high and low endowment countries, and individual deviations from the equilibrium
path have no effect on the value of the median.
In an equilibrium of the dynamic model, fiscal authorities issue nominal bonds treating
the price of nominal bonds and the inflation rate as fixed. It is thus possible to restate
their problems as choosing a quantity of real bonds to buy or sell. In this setup,
they will choose bˆi =
bi
1+pi(B,∆(B)) , taking as given B and the price of real bonds qˆ =
q(1+pi(B,∆(B))). This formulation is convenient for proving some of the results on the
dynamic model, so I will go over these alternative problems and an alternative definition
of equilibrium in terms of real bonds and the price of real bonds.
For any price of real bonds qˆ and a value of B, fiscal authorities in countries that receive
the high endowment shock yH will choose a quantity of real bonds to buy bˆi to solve
max
bˆi
u(y + − qˆbˆi) + β
[
u
(
y + bˆi − ∆ˆ(B)
)
− ψ(pi(B,∆(B)))
]
(3.6)
where ∆ˆ(B) = ∆(B)1+pi(B,∆(B)) . Fiscal authorities in countries that receive the low endow-
ment shock yL will choose a quantity of real bonds to sell bˆi to solve
max
bˆi
u(y − + qˆbˆi) + β
[
u
(
y − bˆi + ∆ˆ(B)
)
− ψ(pi(B,∆(B)))
]
(3.7)
Let bˆH(qˆ, B) and bˆH(qˆ, B) denote the solutions to (3.6) and (3.7) respectively.
Definition. A real-valued equilibrium of the dynamic model is a set of functions bˆH :
R++×R→ R, bˆL : R++×R→ R, pi : R×R+ → R+, and ∆ : R→ R+ as well as values
for the price of real bonds qˆ∗ and the representative nominal bond position B∗ such that
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i.) pi(B,∆) and ∆(B) are an equilibrium of the static model
ii.) Given pi and ∆, bˆH(qˆ, B) solves (3.6) and bˆL(qˆ, B) solves (3.7)
iii.) qˆ∗ and B∗ satisfy the fixed point condition bˆH(qˆ∗, B∗) = bˆL(qˆ∗, B∗) = B
∗
1+pi(B∗,∆(B∗))
To characterize the real-valued equilibrium of the dynamic model, I will make one more
assumption.
Assumption 4. For any value of B, the function bˆH(qˆ, B) is strictly decreasing in qˆ
and the function bˆL(qˆ, B) is strictly increasing in qˆ
Assumption 3 just requires that the demand for real bonds bˆH and the supply of real
bonds bˆL are downward sloping in the price of real bonds and upward sloping in the price
of real bonds, respectively. With assumption 3 in place, the next proposition follows.
Proposition 5. Suppose that assumptions 1, 2, and 3 are satisfied. Then
i.) ∃ a unique real-valued equilibrium of the dynamic model
ii.) The price of real bonds is given by qˆ∗ = β
iii.) bˆH(qˆ
∗, B∗) = bˆL(qˆ∗, B∗) = 11+β [+ ∆ˆ(B
∗)]
where ∆ˆ(B∗) = ∆(B
∗)
1+pi(B∗,∆(B∗))
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B¯ B
Bˆ
B∗

1+β
B
1+pi(B,∆(B))
1
1+β
 + ∆(B)1+pi(B,∆(B))

Figure 3.1: Equilibrium in the Dynamic Model
Figure 3.1 shows a plot of the functions
bˆH(β,B) = bˆL(β,B) =
1
1 + β
[
+
∆(B)
1 + pi(B,∆(B))
]
and
B
1 + pi(B,∆(B))
The horizontal coordinate of the intersection corresponds to the equilibrium value of the
representative fiscal authority’s nominal bond position B, and the vertcial coordinate
is its real value in equilibrium. As per Proposition 4, qˆ∗ = β, hence the fixed point
condition implies that the equilibrium value of B∗ for the dynamic model is determined
by the intersection of these curves. B¯ is the critical value of B such that
∆(B) =
0 B ≤ B¯B − B¯ B > B¯
The kinks in the two curves at B = B¯ represent the switch from no bailouts in the
second period to positive bailouts in the second period. The inflation rate becomes
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fixed for B > B¯, hence B1+pi(B,∆(B)) grows at a constant rate. The bailout encourages
low endowment countries to borrow more and high endowment countries to save more,
so the curve bˆH(β,B) = bˆL(β,B) starts to increase for B > B¯. Notice that the value of
B∗ in Figure 3.1 is less than B¯, which implies that there are no bailouts in equilibrium.
As  increases, the curve
1
1 + β
[
+
∆(B)
1 + pi(B,∆(B))
]
shifts up, and the value of B∗ increases. For  sufficiently large enough, B∗ > B¯, and
there are strictly positive bailouts in equilibrium. This effect can be seen in Figure 3.2.
B¯ B
Bˆ
B∗1
1
1+β
2 > 1
2
1+β
B∗2
Figure 3.2: Effects of  on Equlibrium
 is the standard deviation of the period 1 endowment shocks, and thus a measure of the
risk faced by households in the monetary union. The graphical analysis above suggests
bailouts become active as the risk faced by households increases. This offers a preview
of the risk sharing benefits of bailouts, which will be discussed in detail in the next
section.
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3.3.6 Welfare Effects of Bailouts
In this section, I will discuss how bailouts affect the expected utility of households in
the monetary union. To do this, I will compare the equilibrium of the dynamic model
to the equilibrium of a version of the dynamic model in which fiscal authorities cannot
make bailouts. The environment and timing of this model are identical to the dynamic
model; The only difference is that there is no bailout stage in the second period.As in the
dynamic model with bailouts, in equilibrium all high endowment countries will purchase
the same amount of bonds nominal bonds BH , all low endowment countries will sell the
same amount of bonds BL, and the market for bonds will clear, so BH = BL = B. The
central bank will choose the inflation rate pi to solve
max
pi
1
2
[
u
(
y +
B
1 + pi
)
− ψ(pi)
]
+
1
2
[
u
(
y − B
1 + pi
)
− ψ(pi)
]
s.t. pi ≥ 0
cH , cL ≥ 0
which implies that it will set the inflation rate to pi(B, 0).In the first period, individual
fiscal authorities will treat the representative bond position B as given, and hence will
treat the inflation rate as independent of their choice of how many bonds to buy or sell.
This implies that, as in the model with bailouts, the problem of fiscal authorities can
be formulated in terms of buying and selling real bonds. In particular, fiscal authorities
in high endowment countries will choose to purchase a quantity real bonds bˆi to solve
max
bˆi
u(y + − qˆbˆi) + β
[
u
(
y + bˆi
)
− ψ(pi(B, 0))
]
(3.8)
Denote the solution to this as bˆNBH (qˆ, B). Similarly, low endowment countries will choose
to sell a quantity of real bonds bˆi to solve
max
bˆi
u(y + + qˆbˆi) + β
[
u
(
y − bˆi
)
− ψ(pi(B, 0))
]
(3.9)
Denote the solution to this as bˆNBL (qˆ, B). With these problems stated, I can define
equilibrium for the model without bailouts.
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Definition. A real-valued equilibrium of the dynamic model without bailouts is a set
of functions bˆNBH (qˆ, B), bˆ
NB
L (qˆ, B), and pi(B,∆), as well as values for the price of real
bonds qˆ∗NB and the representative bond position B
∗
NB such that
i.) pi(B,∆) is part of an equilibrium of the static model
ii.) Given pi, bˆNBH (qˆ, B) solves (3.8) and bˆ
NB
L (qˆ, B) solves (3.9)
iii.) qˆ∗NB and B
∗
NB satisfy the fixed point condition bˆ
NB
H (qˆ
∗
NB, B
∗
NB) = bˆ
NB
L (qˆ
∗
NB, B
∗
NB) =
B∗NB
1+pi(B∗NB ,0)
As with the model with bailouts, I will assume that demand for real bonds is decreasing
in the price of real bonds, and the supply of bonds is increasing in the price of real
bonds. Formally
Assumption 5. For any value of B ≥ 0, the function bˆNBH (qˆ, B) is strictly decreasing
in qˆ and the function bˆNBL (qˆ, B) is strictly increasing in qˆ
Assumption 4 guarantees that the results of proposition 4 will carry through to the
model without bailouts, i.e. the equilibrium is unique, the price of real bonds is equal
to β, and in equilibrium
bˆNBH (qˆ
∗
NB, B
∗
NB) = bˆ
NB
L (qˆ
∗
NB, B
∗
NB) =

1 + β
Let
c∗H = y +
1
1 + β
(
− β ∆(B
∗)
1 + pi(B∗,∆(B∗))
)
c∗L = y −
1
1 + β
(
− β ∆(B
∗)
1 + pi(B∗,∆(B∗))
)
c∗H,NB = y +
1
1 + β

c∗L,NB = y −
1
1 + β

i.e. cH is the equilibrium value of consumption in high endowment countries in the model
with bailouts (consumption is the same in both periods, as the real interest rate is equal
to the natural rate in equilibrium), cNBH is the equilibrium value of consumption in high
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endowment countries in the model without bailouts, etc. Then the expected utility of
households in the equilibrium of the dynamic model with bailouts is given by
U∗ = (1 + β)
[
1
2
u(c∗H) +
1
2
u(c∗L)
]
− βψ(pi(B∗,∆(B∗)))
and the expected utility of households of in the equilibrium of the dynamic model
without bailouts is given by
U∗NB = (1 + β)
[
1
2
u(c∗H,NB) +
1
2
u(c∗L,NB)
]
− βψ(pi(B∗NB, 0))
This leads to the following
Proposition 6. Suppose that assumptions 1-4 hold, and that in the equilibrium of the
dynamic model with bailouts ∆(B∗) > 0. Then
i.) pi(B∗,∆(B∗)) < pi(B∗NB, 0)
ii.) U∗ > U∗NB
Proposition 5 states that the ex ante welfare of households will be higher in an equilib-
rium with bailouts than in an equilibrium without bailouts, and that inflation will be
lower in an equilibrium with bailouts than in an equilibrium without bailouts.
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B¯ B
Bˆ
B∗∆ B∗0

1+β
X
Y
Figure 3.3: Equilibrium in the Dynamic Model Without Bailouts
To gain some intuition for this result, consider Figure 3.3, which shows a graph of the
fixed point condition for an equilibrium without bailouts. This equilibrium is point
Y . The dotted extensions of the curves correspond to the fixed point condition for
an equilibrium with bailouts. Hence without bailouts, the equilibrium would occur at
point X. Notice that, relative to the equilibrium with bailouts, the equilibrium without
bailouts features a lower value of real bonds. It appears as if prohibiting bailouts is
solving a moral hazard problem for low endowment countries. However, the vertical axis
of the graph represents the real value of bonds, bˆ, not the real value of the repayment that
low endowment countries will make in the second period, bˆ− ∆ˆ. When low endowment
countries anticipate a positive bailout in the second period, they act as in a permanent
income model, changing their debt issuance in a way that lets households consume
more in periods 1 and periods 2 to achieve intertemporal consumption smoothing. This
implies that the value of real debt issuance bˆ increases less than one for one with the size
of the bailout ∆ˆ, and the real repayment low endowment countries make in equilibrium
will be lower with the bailout. Since low endowment countries will be able to issue more
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real debt and make smaller real repayments, this implies that there will be less risk
in consumption ex ante. Furthermore, a smaller real repayment from low endowment
countries to high endowment countries implies less inequality in consumption in the
second period. The central bank reacts to less inequality with a lower inflation rate.
The fact that the inflation rate is lower in the equilibrium with bailouts can also be
seen in the graph, as the equilibrium nominal value of bonds B∆ is lower than B0, the
equilibrium nominal value of bonds without bailouts, but the equilibrium real value of
bonds is higher.
3.4 Optimal Currency Areas
The analysis of the dynamic model shows that bailouts act as a form of risk sharing
between countries and improve the ex ante welfare of households, and that fiscal author-
ities in high endowment countries agree to bailouts because bailouts forestall surprise
inflation by the central bank. This implies that there is a benefit to forming a monetary
union in an environment in which central banks cannot commit to monetary policy: the
threat of surprise inflation provides the incentives required for risk sharing. Monetary
unions in such environments are subject to a free-rider problem in fiscal policy, as shown
in Chari and Kehoe (2007, 2008). Fiscal authorities tend to over-issue nominal bonds,
as they do not fully internalize the effect of their decision on the incentive of the central
bank to create surprise inflation.5 This presents a new decision margin for the theory
of optimal currency areas. On one hand, the monetary union acts as a commitment
device that makes risk sharing possible; on the other, countries expose themselves to a
potentially costly externality.
In this section, I first present a model without monetary unions to use as a benchmark.
I then go over an example of the dynamic model with quadratic utility to show that it
is possible for the benefits of risk-sharing to exceed the costs of the free-rider problem if
the variance of endowment shocks is sufficiently large. I then alter the dynamic model
slightly to allow for correlation between the endowment shocks of countries and show
that forming a monetary union is more attractive when endowment shocks are less cor-
related. This implies that the tradeoff between risk sharing and the free rider problem
5 For a discussion of the free-rider problem in the context of this model, see the appendix.
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acts to offset the classic Friedman-Mundell optimal currency area criterion, that the
countries that stand to gain the most from forming a monetary union are those that
have the most highly correlated business cycles.
3.4.1 A Model Without Monetary Unions
The environment for the model without monetary unions is identical to that of the
dynamic model with two differences. First, the continuum of countries are no longer a
closed economy. Instead, they trade bonds on the world market at a fixed real interest
rate equal to 1β . I make this change to abstract from any general equilibrium effects
caused by changes in the real interest rate. Second, countries now have individual
central banks that set country-specific inflation rates between periods 1 and 2. Each
central bank faces the same commitment problem as the monetary union’s central bank
did in the dynamic model. The timing for the model without monetary unions is as
follows:6
Period 1
1. Countries receive their random endowments
2. Fiscal authorities buy or sell nominal bonds bi on the world market at a price q(bi)
3. Period 1 consumption occurs
Period 2
1. Countries receive their deterministic endowment
2. Central banks set country specific inflation rates pii
3. Bonds payments are made
4. Period 2 Consumption occurs
6 Notice that there is no bailout problem in this timing. It is easy to show that high endowment
countries would never offer a bailout to low endowment without a monetary union.
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In period 2, given a bond position bi in country i, the central bank chooses the inflation
rate pi to solve
max
pi
u
(
y − bi
1 + pi
)
− ψ(pi)
s.t. pi ≥ 0
y − bi
1 + pi
≥ 0 (3.10)
Denote the solution of this problem as pi(bi). Notice that the solution to this problem
is only country-specific through the value of bi, hence in equilibrium only the argument
of the inflation function pi will vary across countries, not the function itself.
In period 1, countries and the world market will forecast the actions of central banks.
This implies that the price schedule for nominal bonds will be given by
q(bi) =
β
1 + pi(bi)
and the fiscal authority in country i will choose bi to solve
max
bi
u
(
y1i +
βbi
1 + pi(bi)
)
+ β
[
u
(
y − bi
1 + pi(bi)
)
− ψ(pi(bi))
]
(3.11)
where
y1i =
y +  y1i = yHy −  y1i = yL
In a symmetric equilibrium, all high endowment countries will choose the same value
of bi, denoted as bH , and all low endowment countries will choose the same value of bi,
denoted as bL.
Definition. An equilibrium of the model without a monetary union is a pair of functions
pi : R→ R+ and q : R→ R++ and values bH , bL such that
i.) pi(b) solves the central bank’s problem (3.10).
ii.) q(b) = β1+pi(bi)
iii.) Given pi, bH solves the fiscal authority’s problem (3.11) for y1i = yH = y + , and
bL solves the fiscal authority’s problem (3.11) for y1i = yL = y − 
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3.4.2 Quadratic Utility
To offer a comparison of outcomes with and without a monetary union, I will present an
example with a quadratic utility function for consumption that can be solved in closed
form, i.e.
u(c) = −[y¯ − c]2
where y¯ is a parameter assumed to be sufficiently large that c is always smaller than y.
In this environment, there are three reasons why a monetary union might be preferable
to no monetary union from an ex ante perspective. The first is that in a monetary union,
the inflation rate is deterministic. This is generally not the case if the countries don’t
form a monetary union. If ψ is strictly convex, forming a monetary union might be
preferable because it eliminates risk in the inflation rate. The second potential benefit
is that, in a monetary union, the central bank takes into account that inflation has a
negative effect on the wealth of high endowment countries. This offers discipline on
inflation that is absent if there is no monetary union. A low endowment country will
not have a counterweight to its negative asset position to reduce surprise inflation if it is
not a union member. Finally, joining the monetary union gives countries access to risk
sharing through bailouts. My analysis will focus on the third incentive. To eliminate
the first, I will assume linear disutility from inflation
ψ(pi) = ψˆ × (1 + pi)
for some value ψˆ > 0. Although this linear disutility of inflation function satisfies as-
sumption 2 and an optimal level of nominal repayment exist for the monetary union ver-
sion of the model, linear disutility from inflation and quadratic utility from consumption
will not satisfy all of the conditions of assumption 1 that guarantee an interior solution
to the central bank’s problem. I will have to impose other restrictions on model param-
eters to guarantee an interior solution for the central bank’s problem in the equilibrium
of the monetary union model. More detail on this can be found in the appendix, where
I go over the solution to the quadratic utility model. To eliminate the second incentive,
I focus on a subset of the model’s parameter space where country’s would optimally
choose not to form a monetary union if they were restricted not to make bailouts in
the second period. Again, I provide details on how to choose such parameters in the
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appendix.
When an interior solution exists, the ex ante utility of being in a monetary union with
bailouts has a simple quadratic structure. In particular, it is given by the expression
VMU∆ () =
−(1 + β)[y¯ − y]
2 − (1 + 3β)
(

1+β
)2
 ≤ ∗
−(1 + β)[y¯ − y]2 − (1 + 3β)
(
∗
1+β
)2
 > ∗
(3.12)
for some critical value ∗.  > 0, recall, is the endowment shock parameter
yH = y + 
yL = y − 
and is equal to the standard deviation of the endowment shocks. ∗ is the minimum
value of  such that there will be bailouts in equilibrium. It is depicted graphically in
Figure 3.4.
B¯ B
Bˆ
B∗
∗
1+β
B
1+pi(B,∆(B))
1
1+β
∗ + ∆(B)1+pi(B,∆(B))

Figure 3.4: Critical Value ∗
When  < ∗, no risk sharing occurs. As  increases, risk goes up and ex ante welfare
VMU∆ decreases. Once  passes 
∗, bailouts and hence risk sharing kick in, and VMU∆
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ceases to decline. This compares with the function
VMU () = −(1 + β)[y¯ − y]2 − (1 + 3β)
(

1 + β
)2
(3.13)
which gives ex ante welfare if bailouts are not allowed. The two functions coincide for
 < ∗, at which point they diverge as VMU continues to decline.
If countries don’t form a monetary union, then countries that receive a high endowment
shock will choose to save, which does not induce the central bank to inflate. In a model
with a general utility function, low endowment countries will restrict their borrowing
relative to the monetary union case to try to discipline the central bank’s choice of the
inflation rate (this is discussed in more detail in the appendix section on the free-rider
problem). In the case of the quadratic utility model, low endowment countries borrow
as much as possible without inducing the central bank to inflate. Denote this value as
b∗. The ex ante utility of countries that don’t form a monetary union is given by
V A() = −(1 + β)[y¯ − y]2 − 2 + β
2
2 − β(1 + β)
2
b∗2 + βb∗ (3.14)
In the appendix, I show how to choose model parameters ψˆ, β, y¯, and y such that there
is an interval [, ] such that ∗ is in the interval, V A > VMU everywhere in the interval,
and there is a value ˜ ∈ [, ] such that VMU∆ > V A if  > ˜. This implies that, for these
parameters, countries would never choose to form a monetary union if they couldn’t
make bailouts. However, if there is enough risk , the monetary union allows countries
to credibly commit to risk sharing, and the benefits of risk sharing outweigh the costs
of the free-rider problem. This is depicted in Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: Bailouts Make Monetary Union Optimal
3.4.3 Correlation of Shocks
The previous section established the existence of utility functions u and ψ, discount
factors β, and values of the shock  such that countries prefer to form a monetary union
to gain access to bailouts. In this section I will assume that this is the case. I alter the
standard set up slightly to allow for correlation between the income shocks of countries.
Countries still buy and sell bonds on the world market at a real interest rate equal to
the natural rate 1β . There is still a continuum of countries of mass 1. Fraction
1
2 are
type 1 countries, the remainder are type 2 countries. Countries know their type ex
ante. There are four possible states of the world, denoted θHH , θHL, θLH , and θLL, one
of which will be realized. If the state θHH is realized, both types of countries receive
the high endowment shock yH ; if the state θHL is realized, type 1 countries receive
the high endowment shock yH , and type 2 countries receive the low endowment shock
yL; if state θLH is realized, type 1 countries receive the low endowment shock yL, and
type 2 countries receive the high endowment shock yH ; if the state θLL is realized, both
countries receive the low endowment shock yL. The probability of states is given by
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Pr{θHL} = Pr{θLH} = p12 and Pr{θHH} = Pr{θLL} = (1− p)12 .
For any individual country, the unconditional distribution of their income shock is the
same as in the standard model: regardless of whether country i is a type 1 or type 2
country, y1i is equal to yH with probability
1
2 and y1i is equal to yL with probability
1
2 .
Since the values of the shocks in other countries are irrelevant if countries do not form
a monetary union, the ex ante welfare of not forming a monetary union is the same as
in the standard set up. Denote this value as V A.
Now consider what will happen if the countries form a monetary union that allows
bailouts. Let VMU∆,H denote the ex post welfare of a household in a high endowment coun-
try in a monetary union with bailouts for the same utility functions, discount factor, and
shocks in the standard model. Similarly, let VMU∆,L denote the ex post welfare of a house-
hold in a low endowment country in a monetary union with bailouts for the same utility
functions, discount factor, and shocks in the standard model. If state θHL is realized,
1
2
of all countries will have a high endowment (type 1 countries), and 12 of all countries will
have a low endowment (type 2 countries). Then because these countries form a monetary
union, and the monetary union outcome with bailouts is unique, households in type 1
countries’ welfare will be given by VMU∆,H and households in type 2 countries’ welfare will
be given by VMU∆,L . Similarly, if state θLH is realized, the welfare of households in type 1
countries will be VMU∆,L and the welfare of households in type 2 countries will be given by
VMU∆,H . Let Pr{·| θHL, θLH} denote probabilities conditional on state θHL or state θLH
being realized. By construction, Pr{θHL| θHL, θLH} = Pr{θLH | θHL, θLH} = 12 . This
implies that the expected utility of households in type 1 or type 2 countries conditional
on θHL or θLH being realized is given by
1
2
VMU∆,H +
1
2
VMU∆,L
which is just VMU∆ , the ex ante welfare of households in the monetary union with bailouts
in the standard model. By assumption VMU∆ > V
A. If state θHH is realized, at the
natural rate, all fiscal authorities in the monetary union will save to equalize consump-
tion in periods 1 and 2. Since fiscal authorities save, the no deflation constraint for the
central bank will bind, and the inflation rate will be equal to 0. This is exactly the same
as the outcome for an individual country that is not in a monetary union and receives
the high endowment. Denote the welfare of households in this state V AH .
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If the state θLL is realized, all countries will borrow the same amount to equalize con-
sumption in both periods, and there will be no bailouts.7 Denote the welfare of
households in this state as V AL . Note that this does not coincide with the outcome
without a monetary union if a country receives a low endowment shock. Recall that the
fiscal authority in a monetary union issues nominal debt to solve
max
b
u
(
y − + βb
1 + pi(b)
)
+ β
[
u
(
y − b
1 + pi(b)
)
− ψ(pi(b))
]
and the first order condition for this problem is
β
1 + pi(b)
(
u′
(
y − + βb
1 + pi(b)
)
− u′
(
y − b
1 + pi(b)
))
−pi′(b) βb
(1 + pi(b))2
(
u′
(
y − + βb
1 + pi(b)
)
− u′
(
y +
b
1 + pi(b)
))
− βψ′(pi(b))pi′(b) = 0
The inflation function pi(b) coincides with the value of inflation that will prevail in
the monetary union if all countries issue the same nominal debt b, as there will be no
bailouts in this case. If the fiscal authority outside of the monetary union borrows to
equalize consumption, as in the monetary union case, the left hand side of this equation
will be
−βψ′(pi(b))pi′(b)
This will be negative, as pi′ > 0,8 hence the level of debt in the monetary union is not
optimal for countries that don’t form a monetary union. This implies that it must be the
case that the ex post utility of households in a country that receives a low endowment
shock and is not a member of a monetary union V AL > V
A
L .
Let Pr{·| θHH , θLL} denote probabilities conditional on state θHH or θLL being realized.
Note that Pr{θHH | θHH , θLL} = Pr{θLL| θHH , θLL} = 12 . The expected utility of
7 I do not provide a formal proof of this in the thesis, but the argument for this is along the
following lines: If one set of countries has low debt in the second period and offers to bailout the
remaining countries with high debt, the bailout they offer will be smaller than the bailout required
to equalize consumption in the two sets of countries, hence consumption in the countries that make
bailouts must be higher than consumption in countries that receive bailouts. In period 1, countries
that anticipate making a bailout in period 2 treat the bailout as a loss of period 2 income. Since all
countries have the same income in period 1, countries making a bailout have a lower present value of
income and will choose to consume less than countries that receive a bailout in both periods, which is
a contradiction.
8 See the Appendix section on the free-rider problem
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households in both types of country in a monetary union, conditional on a realization
of state θHH or θLL is given by
V˜ =
1
2
V AH +
1
2
V AL <
1
2
V AH +
1
2
V AL = V
A
The unconditional expected utility of households in both types of countries in a mone-
tary union is
VMUρ (p) = (Pr{θHL}+ Pr{θLH})VMU∆ + (Pr{θHH}+ Pr{θLL})V˜ = pVMU∆ + (1− p)V˜
As VMU∆ > V
A > V˜ , VMUρ (p) is strictly increasing in p, V
MU
ρ (1) > V
A, and VMUρ (0) <
V A. This implies that there is some critical value of p, denoted as p∗ such that if p < p∗,
VMUρ (p) < V
A, and countries prefer not to form a monetary union; and if p > p∗,
VMUρ (p) > V
A, and countries do prefer to form a monetary union. The correlation of
the endowment shocks of type 1 and type 2 countries is given by
ρ12 = 1− 2p
so p is a perfect proxy for the correlation of shocks across countries. In this light, the
previous results imply that the value of forming a monetary union is decreasing in the
correlation of shocks between type 1 and type 2 countries; and if the value the correlation
isn’t too high, countries would choose to form a monetary union. The intuition for
the result on correlation is simple. The benefit to forming a monetary union in this
environment is access to risk-sharing through bailouts. If shocks are too correlated
across countries, risk sharing opportunities are scarce, and countries would be better
off not forming a monetary union. This contrasts with the analysis of Friedman (1958)
and Mundell (1961). In this classical treatment, monetary policy is an important tool
for smoothing business cycle shocks. Countries with high correlations of shocks stand
to gain the most from forming a monetary union, as such countries tend to have similar
monetary policy needs and hence lose the least from forgoing policy independence.
The analysis of this paper does not seek to upend their result, merely to augment it
by considering another margin (the tradeoff between risk sharing and free-riding) that
they do not. In this sense, I see my result as a counter-weight to the Friedman-Mundell
logic rather than a contradiction of it.
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3.5 Conclusion
The bailouts the Greek government received during the Eurozone crisis are not a singular
event in history. Many sovereigns received some form of foreign assistance during similar
debt crises. The bailout of Greece does, however, stand out in its scale. This chapter
rationalizes this observation by showing that members of a monetary union with low
debt, such as Germany, have an incentive to bailout members with high debt, such as
Greece, that would not be present if the countries did not share monetary policy: low
debt countries can prevent the central bank from acting to devalue the union’s currency
by engaging in bailouts. It then shows that these bailouts are effectively a form of risk
sharing and improve the welfare of households in member countries from an ex ante
perspective. This presents a new margin for consideration in the theory of optimal
currency areas. Countries can use a monetary union as a commitment mechanism to
engage in risk sharing, but by forming a monetary union the countries expose themselves
to a costly free-rider problem in fiscal policy. I show through an example that it is
possible for the benefits of risk sharing to outweigh the costs of the policy externality.
I also demonstrate that this is more likely to occur if shocks are less correlated across
countries, as lower correlation gives rise to more opportunities for risk sharing, which
contrasts with the classical analysis of the effects of correlation of shocks in the optimal
currency area literature. Overall, I take a more optimistic tone than others on the
future of the Euro. The Eurozone crisis, although costly, demonstrates that the Euro
can facilitate risk sharing between the members of the EMU and might thus be worth
saving.
Chapter 4
Conclusion and Discussion
This thesis has addressed the provision of incentives for risk sharing two contexts. First,
I showed that in-kind benefits for agents that do not work are not necessary to incentivize
labor market participation in a standard model of labor productivity risk. However,
if the standard model is augmented with home production, such a scheme may be
beneficial. Next I showed that a monetary union provides a rationale for low debt
countries to offer bailouts to high debt countries, as such bailouts temper the incentive
of the union’s central bank to inflate the union’s currency to redistribute from low debt
countries to high debt countries. If countries accumulate debt in response to adverse
shocks, then these bailouts will effectively function as insurance payments, as they
flow from lucky countries to unlucky. The monetary union can thus be viewed as a
mechanism that provides the incentives required for countries to engage in this risk
sharing arrangement.
49
Bibliography
Aguiar, Mark, Manuel Amador, Emmanuel Farhi, and Gita Gopinath (2013), “Crisis
and commitment: Inflation credibility and the vulnerability to sovereign debt crises.”
Aguiar, Mark and Erik Hurst (2005), “Lifecycle Prices and Production.” NBER Working
Papers 11601, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, URL https://ideas.
repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/11601.html.
Alesina, Alberto and Robert Barro (2001), “Dollarization.” American Economic Review,
Papers and Proceedings, 91, 381–85.
Atkinson, A. B. and J. E. Stiglitz (1976), “The design of tax structure: Direct versus
indirect taxation.” Journal of Public Economics, 6, 55–75, URL https://ideas.
repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v6y1976i1-2p55-75.html.
Barro, Robert J. and David B. Gordon (1983), “Rules, discretion and reputation in a
model of monetary policy.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 101–121.
Bulow, Jeremy and Kenneth Rogoff (2015), “The modern greek tragedy.” Vox EU.
Chari, VV, Alessandro Dovis, and Patrick Kehoe (2016a), “Journey down the slippery
slope to the european crisis: A theorist’s guide.”
Chari, V.V., Alessandro Dovis, and Patrick Kehoe (2016b), “Rethinking optimal cur-
rency areas.”
Chari, V.V. and Patrick Kehoe (2007), “On the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary
union.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 2399–2408.
50
51
Chari, V.V. and Patrick Kehoe (2008), “Time inconsistency and free-riding in a mone-
tary union.” Journal of Money, Banking, and Credit, 1329–1356.
Chari, V.V. and Patrick Kehoe (2016), “Bailouts, time inconsistency, and optimal reg-
ulation: A macroeconomic view.” American Economic Review, Forthcoming.
Currie, Janet and Firouz Gahvari (2007), “Transfers in Cash and In Kind: Theory Meets
the Data.” NBER Working Papers 13557, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc,
URL https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/13557.html.
Dellas, Harris and George S. Tavlas (2009), “An Optimum-Currency-Area Odyssey.”
Journal of International Money and Finance, 28, 1117–1137.
Farhi, Emmanuel and Ivan Werning (2012), “Fiscal Unions.” NBER Working Papers
18280, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Frankel, Jeffrey and Andrew Rose (1998), “The endogeneity of the optimal currency
area criteria.” Economic Journal, 1009–1025.
Friedman, Milton (1958), “The case for flexible exchange rates.” In Essays in Positive
Economics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Friedman, Milton (1973), “Monetary policy in developing countries.” In Nations and
Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of Moses Abramovitz (Paul A.
David and Melvin W. Reder, eds.), 265–278, Academic Press, New York.
Mundell, Robert A. (1961), “A theory of optimum currency areas.” American Economic
Review, 657–665.
Saez, Emmanuel (2002), “The desirability of commodity taxation under non-linear in-
come taxation and heterogeneous tastes.” Journal of Public Economics, 83, 217–230,
URL https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v83y2002i2p217-230.html.
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Omitted Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Let {{c∗j}, y∗} be an allocation rule that solves (PP). For simplicity
and clarity, I will consider a single history θt with positive mass and y∗t (θt) = 0. This
argument can easily be extended to a set of such histories with positive mass by applying
the following argument to all histories in the set. Consider the following minimization
problem
min
{cj}
N∑
j=1
cj
s.t. Gt(c1, . . . , cN , 0) = Gt(c
∗
1t(θ
t), . . . , c∗Nt(θ
t), 0) (P1)
Let {cj} be any consumption bundle that satisfies the constraints of (P1). Define an
allocation rule {{cˆj}, yˆ} as follows
yˆ(θs) = y∗(θs)
cˆjs(θ
s) =
c∗js(θs) θs 6= θtcj θs = θt
Notice that if we can show that the allocation rule {{cˆj}, yˆ} satisfies the constraints of
(PP), it would follow that {c∗jt(θt)} must solve (P1) (otherwise, it would be possible to
52
53
construct an alternative allocation to the solution to (PP) that was incentive compatible
and satisfied voluntary participation, and used strictly less resources in history θt, and
hence lowered the planner’s objective, namely {{cˆj}, yˆ}). To show this, let σ be any
reporting strategy, θ˜T be any history of length T , and θ˜s denote an s-length sub-history
of θ˜T . Observe that, by the construction of {{cˆj}, yˆ}
Gs
(
cˆ1s(σ
s(θ˜s)), . . . , cˆNs(σ
s(θ˜s)),
yˆs(σ
s(θ˜s))
θ˜s
)
=
Gs
(
c∗1s(σs(θ˜s)), . . . , c∗Ns(σ
s(θ˜s)), y
∗
s (σ
s(θ˜s))
θ˜s
)
σs(θ˜s) 6= θt
Gt
(
c1, . . . , cN ,
y∗(σt(θ˜t))
θ˜t
)
σs(θ˜s) = θt
and for this second case, we have
Gt
(
c1, . . . , cN ,
y∗t (σt(θ˜t))
θ˜t
)
= Gt(c1, . . . , cN , 0)
=Gt(c
∗
1t(θ
t), . . . , c∗Nt(θ
t), 0)
=Gt
(
c∗1t(σ
t(θ˜t)), . . . , c∗Nt(σ
t(θ˜t)),
y∗t (σt(θ˜t))
θ˜t
)
Here, the second line follows from the fact that {cj} satisfies the constraint of (P1) and
the third line from the fact that y∗t (θt) = 0. Hence, ∀ s
Gs
(
cˆ1s(σ
s(θ˜s)), . . . , cˆNs(σ
s(θ˜s)),
yˆs(σ
s(θ˜s))
θ˜s
)
=Gs
(
c∗1s(σ
s(θ˜s)), . . . , c∗Ns(σ
s(θ˜s)),
y∗s(σs(θ˜s))
θ˜s
)
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Thus
U
(
cˆ10(σ
0(θ˜0)), . . . , cˆN0(σ
0(θ˜0)),
yˆ0(σ
0(θ˜0))
θ˜0
, . . .
cˆ1T (σ
T (θ˜T )), . . . , cˆNT (σ
T (θ˜T )),
yˆT (σ
T (θ˜T ))
θ˜T
)
=
V
(
G0
(
cˆ10(σ
0(θ˜0)), . . . , cˆN0(σ
0(θ˜0)),
yˆ0(σ
0(θ˜0))
θ˜0
)
, . . .
GT
(
cˆ1T (σ
T (θ˜T )), . . . , cˆNT (σ
T (θ˜T )),
yˆT (σ
T (θ˜T ))
θ˜T
))
=
V
(
G0
(
c∗10(σ
0(θ˜0)), . . . , c∗N0(σ
0(θ˜0)),
y∗0(σ0(θ˜0))
θ˜0
)
, . . .
GT
(
c∗1T (σ
T (θ˜T )), . . . , c∗NT (σ
T (θ˜T )),
y∗T (σ
T (θ˜T ))
θ˜T
))
=
U
(
c∗10(σ
0(θ˜0)), . . . , c∗N0(σ
0(θ˜0)),
y∗0(σ0(θ˜0))
θ˜0
, . . .
c∗1T (σ
T (θ˜T )), . . . , c∗NT (σ
T (θ˜T )),
y∗T (σ
T (θ˜T ))
θ˜T
)
Since the choice of θ˜T was arbitrary, this relationship holds in expectation, implying
Uσ({{cˆj}, yˆ}) = Uσ({{c∗j}, y}) (A.1)
and since the choice of reporting strategies σ was arbitrary, this holds for all σ. In
particular, it holds for truth-telling, which implies
U({{cˆj}, yˆ}) = U({{c∗j}, y∗}) (A.2)
Then, the fact that {{c∗j}, y∗} is a solution to (PP) and (A.2) implies that
U({{cˆj}, yˆ}) = U({{c∗j}, y∗}) ≥ U
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and hence {{cˆj}, yˆ} satisfies promise keeping. Furthermore, since {{c∗j}, y∗} is a solution
to (PP), (A.1) and (A.2) imply that
U({{cˆj}, yˆ}) = U({{c∗j}, y∗}) ≥ Uσ({{c∗j}, y}) = Uσ({{cˆj}, yˆ}) ∀ σ
and hence {{cˆj}, yˆ} satisfies incentive compatibility, thus {c∗jt(θt)} must solve (P1).
Then, since {c∗jt(θt)} is a solution to (P1), {c∗jt(θt)}must satisfy the first order conditions
of (P1). These first order conditions are given by
1 = λGtj(c1, . . . , cN , 0)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the equality constraint in (P1). This
in turn implies
Gti(c1, . . . , cN , 0)
Gtj(c1, . . . , cN , 0)
= 1 ∀ i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}
Substituting {c∗jt(θt)} above completes the proof.
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Omitted Proofs
Before going through the proofs for the static model, I will prove two useful lemmas.
Lemma 1. Suppose that u and ψ satisfy the conditions of assumption 1. Then
i.) The non-negativity constraints do not bind in any solution to the central bank’s
problem, and the no-deflation constraint does not bind if B −∆ 6= 0
ii.) The objective function of the central bank is strictly concave in pi if B−∆ 6= 0 and
cH = y +
B−∆
1+pi > 0 and cL = y − B−∆1+pi > 0
iii.) If B−∆ 6= 0, a unique solution to the central bank’s first order condition pi(B,∆) >
0 always exists
iv.) if B −∆ = 0, pi(B,∆) = 0
Proof. i.) follows immediately from the fact that u satisfies the Inada conditions and is
strictly concave, and that ψ′(0) = 0.
For ii.), taking the first derivative of the central bank’s objective function with respect
to pi yields
1
2
B −∆
(1 + pi)2
[
u′
(
y − B −∆
1 + pi
)
− u′
(
y +
B −∆
1 + pi
)]
− ψ′(pi)
56
57
Differentiating again with respect to pi yields
− B −∆
(1 + pi)3
[
u′
(
y − B −∆
1 + pi
)
− u′
(
y +
B −∆
1 + pi
)]
+
1
2
(
B −∆
(1 + pi)2
)2 [
u′′
(
y − B −∆
1 + pi
)
+ u′′
(
y +
B −∆
1 + pi
)]
− ψ′′(pi)
which is negative for any value of B − ∆ 6= 0 if cH , cL > 0 because u′ is decreasing,
u′′ < 0 and ψ is convex under conditions of assumption 1.
Finally, for iii.), the first order condition for the central bank, ignoring the non-
negativity and no-deflation constraints as they don’t bind, is given by
1
2
B −∆
(1 + pi)2
[
u′
(
y − B −∆
1 + pi
)
− u′
(
y +
B −∆
1 + pi
)]
− ψ′(pi) = 0
As pi decreases, either cH = y +
B−∆
1+pi or cL = y − B−∆1+pi goes to zero, depending on
the sign of B−∆, hence the first term approaches infinity because u satisfies the Inada
conditions, and the term −ψ′(pi) increases towards 0 because ψ is convex. As pi increases
toward infinity, the first term approaches zero, and the second term is bounded away
from zero, because ψ′ is increasing. The concavity property established in ii.) implies
that this function is strictly decreasing in pi. Hence a unique solution pi > 0 to this first
order condition exists by the intermediate value theorem.
iv.) is obvious, neither country’s consumption depends on pi if B − ∆ = 0 and ψ is
increasing
Note that it follows immediately from lemma 1 that the solution to the central bank’s
problem pi(B,∆) is unique. Note also that the central bank’s first order condition
holds with equality at pi = 0 for B − ∆ = 0. This implies that, although the non-
deflation constraint holds with equality at B −∆ = 0, it does not bind, hence there is
no discontinuity in pi at B−∆ = 0. The next lemma establishes some useful properties
of this function.
Lemma 2. Let pi(B,∆) be the unique solution to central bank’s problem. Then pi(B,∆) =
pi(B −∆, 0) and pi(B, 0) = pi(−B, 0).
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Proof. For the first property, note that the value of the central bank’s first order con-
dition satisfies
1
2
B −∆
(1 + pi)2
[
u′
(
y − B −∆
1 + pi
)
− u′
(
y +
B −∆
1 + pi
)]
− ψ′(pi) =
1
2
(B −∆)− 0
(1 + pi)2
[
u′
(
y − (B −∆)− 0
1 + pi
)
− u′
(
y +
(B −∆)− 0
1 + pi
)]
− ψ′(pi)
i.e. the value of the derivative of the central bank’s objective is the same for a nominal
repayment of B and a transfer of ∆ and a nominal repayment of B −∆ and a transfer
of 0, hence the first property follows from result iii.) in lemma 1.
For the second property, note that the value of the central bank’s first order condition
at any value pi satisfies
1
2
B
(1 + pi)2
[
u′
(
y − B
1 + pi
)
− u′
(
y +
B
1 + pi
)]
− ψ′(pi) =
1
2
−B
(1 + pi)2
[
u′
(
y − −B
1 + pi
)
− u′
(
y +
−B
1 + pi
)]
− ψ′(pi)
i.e. the value of the derivative of the central bank’s objective is the same for B and −B,
hence the second property follows from result iii.) in lemma 1.
With these lemmas established, I will move onto the proofs of the propositions for the
static model.
Proof of Proposition 1. Uniqueness of pi(B,∆) was established in the discussion follow-
ing the proof of lemma 1. For the result that ∂pi∂∆ < 0, note that it follows from lemma 1
that the function pi(B,∆) is implicitly defined by the first order condition of the central
bank
1
2
B −∆
(1 + pi)2
[
u′
(
y − B −∆
1 + pi
)
− u′
(
y +
B −∆
1 + pi
)]
− ψ′(pi) = 0
Differentiating this equation with respect to ∆ and using the identities cH = y +
B−∆
1+pi
and cL = y − B−∆1+pi , we have
1
2
B −∆
(1 + pi)3
× [u′′(cL)− u′′(cH)]− 1
2
1
(1 + pi)2
[u′(cL)− u′(cH)]+
∂pi
∂∆
×
[
− B −∆
(1 + pi)3
× [u′(cL)− u′(cH)]+
1
2
(
B −∆
(1 + pi)2
)2
× [u′′(cL) + u′′(cH)]− ψ′′(pi)
]
= 0
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Rearranging and solving for ∂pi∂∆ yields
∂pi
∂∆
= −
1
2
B−∆
(1+pi)3
× [u′′(cL)− u′′(cH)]− 12 1(1+pi)2 [u′(cL)− u′(cH)]
− B−∆
(1+pi)3
× [u′(cL)− u′(cH)] + 12
(
B−∆
(1+pi)2
)2 × [u′′(cL) + u′′(cH)]− ψ′′(pi)
The denominator of this fraction is just the second derivative of the central bank’s
objective function, which is negative by result ii.) of lemma 1. The numerator is negative
whenever B−∆ > 0 because, under the conditions of assumption 1, u′′ is non-decreasing
and u′ is decreasing and B −∆ > 0 implies cH > cL. Therefore ∂pi∂∆ < 0.
For the third property, consider any value B > 0 and values 0 ≤ ∆1 < ∆2 ≤ B. Define
a value pˆi such that
B −∆1
1 + pi(B,∆1)
=
B −∆2
1 + pˆi
Notice that because ∆1 < ∆2, pˆi < pi(B,∆1). Now, if pˆi < 0, then pi(B,∆2) > pˆi and
B−∆1
1+pi(B,∆1)
> B−∆21+pi(B,∆2) . If pˆi ≥ 0, then it follows from the definitions of pˆi and the fact
that pˆi < pi(B,∆1) that
1
2
B −∆2
(1 + pˆi)2
[
u′
(
y − B −∆2
1 + pˆi
)
− u′
(
y +
B −∆2
1 + pˆi
)]
− ψ′(pˆi) >
1
2
B −∆1
(1 + pi(B,∆1))2
[
u′
(
y − B −∆1
1 + pi(B,∆1)
)
− u′
(
y +
B −∆1
1 + pi(B,∆1)
)]
− ψ′(pi(B,∆1)) = 0
Then concavity of the objective function of the central bank implies that pi(B,∆2) >
pˆi and B−∆11+pi(B,∆1) >
B−∆2
1+pi(B,∆2)
. In both cases, it must be the case that B−∆11+pi(B,∆1) >
B−∆2
1+pi(B,∆2)
. Since the choices of B, ∆1, and ∆2 were arbitrary, this implies that
B−∆
1+pi(B,∆)
is decreasing in ∆.
Note that, because the no-deflation constraint does not bind for B−∆ = 0, the formula
for ∂pi∂∆ derived in this proof is valid for the case B = ∆. In particular,
∂pi
∂∆ = 0 whenever
B = ∆
Proof of Proposition 2. Notice that it follows immediately from part iii.) of propostion
1 that, if B > 0, then UL(B,B) > UL(B, 0), i.e. ∆ = B satisfies the constraints of the
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bailout problem (3.3). Furthermore, for any value ∆ such that ∆ > B, lemma 1 implies
that pi(B,∆) > 0. This, combined with result iv.) from lemma 1 implies that
u(y)−ψ(0) = u
(
y +
B −B
1 + pi(B,B)
)
−ψ(pi(B,B)) > u
(
y − B −∆
1 + pi(B,∆)
)
−ψ(pi(B,∆))
i.e. it is always feasible for creditor countries to set ∆ = B in the bailout problem,
and this yields strictly higher utility than any ∆ > B, hence it must be the case that
∆(B) ≤ B.
Finally, note that, because B−∆1+pi(B,∆) is decreasing in ∆, and that, as per proposition 1,
∂pi
∂∆ < 0 whenever ∆ ∈ (0, B), the function UL(B,∆) is increasing in ∆ on this interval.
Since ∆(B) ∈ [0, B], by the non-negativity constraint and the previous result, it follows
that UL(B,∆(B)) = UL(B, 0) ⇔ ∆(B) = 0, i.e. the participation constraint of debtor
countries holds with equality in the solution to the bailout problem if and only the
optimal bailout is 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let B˜ = B −∆. It follows from lemma 2 that
u
(
y +
B −∆
1 + pi(B,∆)
)
− ψ(pi(B,∆)) = u
(
y +
B˜
1 + pi(B˜, 0)
)
− ψ(pi(B˜, 0)) (B.1)
Notice that the right hand side of (B.1) is a function only of B˜, and in particular does
not depend on ∆. Call this function UHN (B˜).
Claim 1. ∃ a unique value B¯ ∈ (0,∞) of B˜ that maximizes UHN .
Proof of Claim 1. Define a function
Bˆ(B˜) =
B˜
1 + pi(B˜, 0)
i.e. Bˆ(B˜) is the real value of debt repayment associated with a nominal repayment of
B˜.
Claim 2. Bˆ(B˜) is strictly increasing whenever B˜ ≥ 0 and strictly decreasing whenever
B˜ < 0.
Proof of Claim 2. Suppose that B˜1 > B˜2 ≥ 0. Notice that, by lemma 2,
Bˆ(B˜2) =
B˜2
1 + pi(B˜2, 0)
=
B˜1 − (B˜1 − B˜2)
1 + pi(B˜1, B˜1 − B˜2)
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It then follows from proposition 1 that Bˆ(B˜1) > Bˆ(B˜2). That Bˆ(B˜) is decreasing when
B˜ < 0 follows immediately from the fact that Bˆ(B˜) is strictly increasing whenever
B˜ ≥ 0 and the symmetry of pi implied by lemma 2.
Claim 2 establishes that the function Bˆ(B˜) has a well defined inverse Bˆ−1. Next, define
a function
pˆi(bˆ) = pi(Bˆ−1(bˆ), 0)
pˆi gives the inflation rate associated with any real repayment bˆ. Next, define a function
UHR(bˆ) = u(y + bˆ)− ψ(pˆi(bˆ))
UHR(bˆ) is the utility of receiving real repayment of bˆ, given the value of inflation rate
that the central bank sets for this real repayment pˆi. Then, since Bˆ is invertible, B¯ will
maximize UHN if and only if Bˆ(B¯) maximizes UHR. This implies that to prove Claim
1, it suffices to show that there is a unique bˆ ∈ (0, y) that maximizes UHR (the upper
bound follows from the non-negativity constraint on consumption in the central bank’s
problem). The derivative of UHR is given by
U ′HR(bˆ) = u(y + bˆ)− ψ′(pˆi(bˆ))×
dpˆi
dbˆ
(B.2)
It follows from the first order condition of the central bank that pˆi satisfies the following
identity
1
2
bˆ[u′(y − bˆ)− u′(y + bˆ)] = ψ′(pˆi(bˆ))× [1 + pˆi(bˆ)] (B.3)
(B.3) immediately implies that pˆi(0) = 0, and that, as bˆ → y, pˆi(bˆ) → ∞, because u
satisfies the Inada conditions by assumption 1. Let H(pi) = ψ′(pi)[1 + pi]. Notice that,
because ψ is convex by assumption 1, H is increasing, and that, by assumption 2, H is
concave. Differentiating both sides of (B.3) with repsect to bˆ, we have
1
2
[u′(y − bˆ)− u′(y + bˆ)]− 1
2
bˆ[u′′(y − bˆ) + u′′(y + bˆ)] = H′(pˆi(bˆ))× dpˆi
dbˆ
(B.4)
The left hand side of (B.4) is positive if bˆ > 0 and negative if bˆ < 0 because u is strictly
concave by assumption 1. H′ is positive, so this implies that dpˆi
dbˆ
is positive if bˆ > 0 and
negative if bˆ < 0. Furthermore, this implies that the function UHR is always increasing
when bˆ < 0, hence any bˆ < 0 can’t be a maximum, and I can restrict attention to positive
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values of bˆ. Note that both items in the term ψ′(pˆi(bˆ))× dpˆi
dbˆ
are positive whenever bˆ > 0,
as ψ is strictly increasing by assumption 1. Differentiating both sides of (B.4) with
respect to bˆ, we have
−1
2
[u′′(y − bˆ) + u′′(y + bˆ)]− 1
2
bˆ[u′′(y − bˆ) + u′′(y + bˆ)]
−1
2
[u′′′(y + bˆ)− u′′′(y − bˆ)] = H′′(pˆi(bˆ))× dpˆi
dbˆ
+H′(pˆi(bˆ))× d
2pˆi
dbˆ2
(B.5)
Since u is strictly concave by assumption 1 and u′′′ is non-increasing by assumption 2,
the left hand side of (B.5) is non-negative if bˆ > 0. Since H is strictly increasing by
assumption 1 and concave by assumption 2, and pˆi is strictly increasing, non-negativity
of the left hand side requires d
2pˆi
dbˆ2
to be non-negative if bˆ > 0, i.e. pˆi is convex when
bˆ is positive. Then because the function pˆi is convex and non-decreasing, the term
ψ′(pˆi(bˆ)) × dpˆi
dbˆ
is non-decreasing when bˆ > 0, because ψ is convex by assumption 1 and
both terms are positive. By assumption 1 u is strictly concave, which implies U ′HR is
strictly decreasing on the interval (0, y). Notice that U ′HR(0) > 0, which implies that
U ′HR > 0 for sufficiently small values of bˆ. Furthermore, as bˆ → y, pˆi(bˆ) → ∞ and
y + bˆ is bounded. This, combined with the fact that ψ is convex by assumption 1,
implies that UHR → −∞ as bˆ→ y, hence UHR must be decreasing at some point, which
implies that U ′HR switches signs. The intermediate value theorem implies that ∃ bˆ∗ > 0
such that U ′HR(bˆ
∗) = 0. Monotonicity of U ′HR implies bˆ
∗ is unique, and U ′HR switches
from positive to negative at bˆ∗, which implies that (bˆ∗) is a maximum. Furthermore, it
must be a global maximum as UHR is increasing ∀ bˆ ∈ (0, bˆ∗) (because U ′HR > 0) and
decreasing ∀ bˆ ∈ (bˆ∗, y) (because U ′HR < 0). B¯ = Bˆ−1(bˆ∗) is the value of nominal debt
for claim 1.
It follows from claim 1 and its proof that UHN is strictly increasing if B˜ ∈ [0, B¯) and
strictly decreasing if B˜ ∈ (B¯,∞). Then since
u
(
y +
B −∆
1 + pi(B,∆)
)
− ψ(pi(B,∆)) = UHN (B −∆)
it follows that the objective of the bailout problem (3.3) is increasing in ∆ whenever
∆ < B − B¯ and is decreasing otherwise. Given that the participation constraint of
debtor countries will be satisfied for any ∆ ≥ 0 as per proposition 2, this implies that
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the solution to the bailout problem has the form
∆(B) =
0 B ≤ B¯B − B¯ B > B¯
Then given that B¯ is unique, ∆(B) is also unique.
Proof of Proposition 4. First, uniqueness of the functions pi and ∆ follow from propo-
sitions 1 and 3. Uniqueness of bˆH and bˆL follow trivially from the strict concavity of u.
To show that qˆ∗ and B∗ are unique, I begin the proof with the following claim:
Claim 3. Suppose that bˆH(qˆ, B) and bˆL(qˆ, B)solve (3.6) and (3.6), respectively. Then
bˆH(qˆ, B) = bˆL(qˆ, B) ⇔ qˆ = β
Proof of Claim 3. For qˆ = β, both high endowment and low endowment countries will
choose bˆi to equate consumption in periods 1 and 2. This implies
bˆH(β,B) = bˆL(β,B) =
1
1 + β
[+ ∆ˆ(B)]
where
∆ˆ(B) =
∆(B)
1 + pi(B,∆(B))
Then because bˆH and bˆL are strictly decreasing in qˆ and strictly increasing in qˆ, respec-
tively, qˆ = β is the only value of qˆ such that bˆH(qˆ, B) = bˆL(qˆ, B).
This implies that in any real-valued equilibrium of the dynamic model, qˆ∗ = β. This
immediately implies that
bˆH(qˆ
∗, B∗) = bˆL(qˆ∗, B∗) =
1
1 + β
[+ ∆ˆ(B∗)]
To see that the real valued equilibrium is unique, note that the above argument implies
that the equilibrium price of real bonds qˆ∗. The functions pi and ∆ are unique, by
propositions 1 and 3 respectively, and the functions bˆH and bˆL are uniquely defined by
the strict concavity of u. All that remains to be established is that B∗ is unique. To
see this, note that, given the functional form for ∆ derived in proposition 3,
bˆH(β,B) = bˆL(β,B) =

1 + β
+
1
1 + β
× max{0, B − B¯}
1 + pi(max{0, B − B¯},min{B, B¯})
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This implies that the fixed point condition for equilibrium requires

1 + β
+
1
1 + β
× max{0, B − B¯}
1 + pi(max{0, B − B¯},min{B, B¯}) =
B
1 + pi(max{0, B − B¯},min{B, B¯}) (B.6)
Notice that the left-hand side of (B.6) is positive and the right-hand side is equal to 0
at B = 0. For B < B¯ the left hand side is constant and the right-hand side is increasing
(this is implied by proposition 2 and lemma 2). For B > B¯, the left hand side increases
with a constant slope equal to 1
(1+β)(1+pi(B¯,0))
and the right-hand side increases with a
constant slope equal to 1
1+pi(B¯,0)
. This implies that the derivative of the right-hand side
of (B.6) is always lager than that of the left-hand side. Combined with the fact that the
left-hand side is larger than the right-hand side at B = 0 and that the right-hand side
increases without bound as B → ∞, this immediately implies that there is a unique
B∗ > 0 such that (B.6) is satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 5. Recall from proposition 4 that the equilibrium real interest rate
in the dynamic model with bailouts is equal to the natural rate 1β . By a similar ar-
gument to the one presented in the proof of proposition 4, this will also hold in the
equilibrium of the dynamic model without bailouts. This implies that in both both
models, fiscal authorities will choose asset positions that equalize consumption in peri-
ods 1 and 2. Let c∗H denote the equilibrium value of consumption for high endowment
countries with bailouts, c∗H,NB denote the equilibrium value of consumption for high
endowment countries without bailouts, c∗L denote the equilibrium value of consumption
for low endowment countries with bailouts, and c∗L,NB denote the equilibrium value of
consumption for low endowment countries with without bailouts. These values will be
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given by
c∗H = y +
1
1 + β
(
− β ∆(B
∗)
1 + pi(B∗,∆(B∗))
)
c∗L = y −
1
1 + β
(
− β ∆(B
∗)
1 + pi(B∗,∆(B∗))
)
c∗H,NB = y +
1
1 + β

c∗L,NB = y −
1
1 + β

Households’ expected utility from consumption with bailouts is given by
U∗C = (1 + β)
[
1
2
u(c∗H) +
1
2
u(c∗L)
]
households’ expected utility from consumption without bailouts is given by
U∗C,NB = (1 + β)
[
1
2
u(c∗H,NB) +
1
2
u(c∗L,NB)
]
Notice that the expected value of consumption is equal to y with and without bailouts.
If ∆(B∗) > 0, then the variance of consumption with bailouts is strictly less than the
variance of consumption without bailouts. As u is strictly concave by assumption 1, it
follows immediately that U∗C > UC,NB. Recall from proposition 4 that, with bailouts,
the equilibrium real value of bonds is given by
Bˆ∗ =
B∗
1 + pi(B∗,∆(B∗))
=
1
1 + β
[
+
∆(B∗)
1 + pi(B∗,∆(B∗))
]
and the equilibrium real value of the repayment from low endowment countries to high
endowment countries will be given by
Bˆ∗∆ = Bˆ
∗ − ∆(B
∗)
1 + pi(B∗,∆(B∗))
=
1
1 + β
[
− β ∆(B
∗)
1 + pi(B∗,∆(B∗))
]
By a similar argument to that presented in the proof of proposition 4, without bailouts,
the equilibrium real value of debt, which is equal to the real value of the repayment
made from low endowment to high endowment countries, is equal to
Bˆ∗NB =
B∗NB
1 + pi(B∗NB, 0)
=
1
1 + β

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Notice that if ∆(B∗) > 0, then Bˆ∗∆ < Bˆ
∗
NB. Furthermore, the first order condition of
the central bank’s problem implies that
1
2
Bˆ∗∆
[
u′(y − Bˆ∗∆)− u′(y + Bˆ∗∆)
]
= ψ′(pi(B∗,∆(B∗)))[1 + pi(B∗,∆(B∗))] (B.7)
and
1
2
Bˆ∗NB
[
u′(y − Bˆ∗NB)− u′(y + Bˆ∗NB)
]
= ψ′(pi(B∗NB, 0))[1 + pi(B
∗
NB, 0)] (B.8)
Then because Bˆ∗∆ < Bˆ
∗
NB, the left-hand side of (B.7) is strictly less than the left-
hand side of (B.8), because u′ is strictly decreasing, by assumption 1. This implies
that pi(B∗,∆(B∗)) < pi(B∗NB, 0), since the function ψ
′(pi)(1 + pi) is strictly increasing,
because ψ is convex and strictly increasing by assumption 1. This establishes i.). ii.)
follows immediately from the fact that expected utility from consumption is higher with
bailouts and pi(B∗,∆(B∗)) < pi(B∗NB, 0).
B.2 Median Voter Model
There are two time periods, t = 1, 2. There is a continuum of countries indexed by
i ∈ [0, 1] that form a monetary union. Each country i is populated by a single represen-
tative household and a fiscal authority. The household has preferences over expected
consumption of a single final good in periods 1 and 2, and the union-wide inflation rate
pi represented by
E[u(c1i) + β[u(c2i)− ψ(pi)]]
where u and ψ satisfy the conditions of assumptions 1 and 2. The fiscal authorities are
benevolent and seek to maximize the welfare of households. In the first period, each
country receives a random endowment of the period 1 consumption good, y1i. y1i takes
one of two values with equal probability: yH = y+ and yL = y−. Endowment shocks
are iid across countries. In the second period, all countries receive a common endowment
of the period 2 consumption good y. Let {y1i} be the distribution of endowment shocks
in period 1. After the distribution of shocks is realized, fiscal authorities trade nominal
bonds in a perfectly competitive market at a price q({y1i}). Let {bj({y1i})}y1j=yH and
{bj({y1i})}y1j=yL denote the distribution of bond positions high and low endowment
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countries, respectively. The monetary union is a closed economy, so the bond market
must clear in equilibrium. For notational convenience, I will write the problem of high
endowment fiscal authorities as choosing a quantity of bonds to sell and low endowment
fiscal authorities as choosing a quantity of bonds to buy, but I don’t impose any non-
negativity constraints, so both types of countries could be borrowers or lenders in the
bond market.
There is a single central bank that sets the inflation rate pi between periods 1 and
2 without commitment. In period 2, fiscal authorities in high endowment countries
will offer a bailout to fiscal authorities in low endowment countries. Bailouts will be
determined by representatives voted on by the fiscal authorities in high endowment and
low endowment countries. In particular, there are 4 political candidates, denoted P1H ,
P2H , P1L, and P2L. Two of these politicians, P1H and P2H , are candidates to represent
high endowment countries. Both candidates make a binding campaign promises to offer
low endowment countries a bailout, which takes the form of an offer to forgive some
amount ∆ ≥ 0 of the face value of the nominal bonds of all low endowment countries.
The winning candidate receives some non-pecuniary benefit U > 0, and the losing
candidate receives nothing. The winning candidate is decided by majority voting, and
all fiscal authorities are assumed to vote sincerely. After the winning candidate makes
the bailout proposal, candidates P1L and P2L make binding campaign promises to accept
or reject the bailout offer. If the bailout offer is rejected, then the value of the bailout is
set equal to zero. Again, the winning candidate receives a non-pecuniary benefit U , the
losing candidate receives nothing, the winner is chosen by majority voting, this time by
fiscal authorities in low endowment countries, and fiscal authorities vote sincerely. It is
assumed that politicians and fiscal authorities in high endowment countries rationally
anticipate election outcomes in low endowment countries. The central bank sets the
inflation rate after bailouts are determined, taking as given the distribution of nominal
bond holdings of fiscal authorities and the value of the bailout ∆ as given. Its problem
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is given by
max
pi
∫
y1i=yH
u
(
y +
bi −∆
1 + pi
)
− ψ(pi)di+
∫
y1i=yL
u
(
y − bi −∆
1 + pi
)
− ψ(pi)di
s.t. pi ≥ 0
ci ≥ 0 ∀ i (B.9)
Denote the solution to this problem by pi({bj({y1i})}y1j=yH , {bj({y1i}y1j=yL ,∆), and for
brevity, write this as pi(BH , BL,∆), understanding that capital B’s denote distributions.
The period 2 utility of the household in a high endowment country with bond position
bi from a bailout of ∆ is for bond distributions {bj({y1i})}y1j=yH and ({bj({y1i})}y1j=yL
given by (again, using the abbreviated notation)
UH(bi, BH , BL,∆) = u
(
y +
bi −∆
1 + pi(BH , BL,∆)
)
− ψ(pi(BH , BL,∆))
Let bMH (BH) denote the median of the support of the distribution of BH . Consider
two alternative values of the bailout ∆1 and ∆2. Let MH(∆1) denote that measure of
countries in the distribution BH such that UH(bi, BH , BL,∆1) ≥ UH(bi, BH , BL,∆2)
and let MH(∆2) denote the measure of countries such that UH(bi, BH , BL,∆2) ≥
UH(bi, BH , BL,∆1).
Claim 4. MH(∆1) ≥MH(∆2) if and only if
UH(b
M
H (BH), BH , BL,∆1) ≥ UH(bMH (BH), BH , BL,∆2)
Proof. Suppose that UH(b
M
H (BH), BH , BL,∆1) ≥ UH(bMH (BH), BH , BL,∆2). I consider
2 cases. First, suppose that pi(BH , BL,∆1) > pi(BH , BL,∆2). If this is true, then the
consumption of the household of the a fiscal authority holding bMH (BH) must be higher
with a bailout equal to ∆1 than with a bailout of ∆2. The difference in the consumption
of an arbitrary household whose fiscal authority’s bond position is bi under ∆1 and under
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∆2 is given by (
y +
bi −∆1
1 + pi(BH , BL,∆1)
)
−
(
y +
bi −∆2
1 + pi(BH , BL,∆2)
)
=
bi
(
1
1 + pi(BH , BL,∆1)
− 1
1 + pi(BH , BL,∆2)
)
−(
∆1
1 + pi(BH , BL,∆1)
− ∆2
1 + pi(BH , BL,∆2)
)
Notice that only the first term depends on bi and that, given thatpi(BH , BL,∆1) >
pi(BH , BL,∆2), this term is decreasing in bi. This implies that, if consumption for the
household of the fiscal authority with the median bond holding increases, then so must
the consumption of households in countries whose fiscal authorities’ bond holdings are
lower than the median. Furthermore, these households gain more consumption than
the median bond holder’s household. Given that these households also have higher
marginal utilities of consumption, they receive a larger utility gain than the median
bond holder’s household, hence MH(∆1) ≥MH(∆2). For the second case, suppose that
pi(BH , BL,∆1) < pi(BH , BL,∆2). Again, the difference in consumption for a household
whose fiscal authority has bond holdings bi will be
bi
(
1
1 + pi(BH , BL,∆1)
− 1
1 + pi(BH , BL,∆2)
)
−(
∆1
1 + pi(BH , BL,∆1)
− ∆2
1 + pi(BH , BL,∆2)
)
where, again, only the first term depends on bi, but is now increasing in bi. This implies
that if the household of the fiscal authority gains consumption under ∆1, households of
all fiscal authorities with bond holdings larger than the median will also gain consump-
tion, and hence will also gain utility under ∆1, as inflation will be lower and consumption
will be higher. If the household of the median bond holder loses consumption under
∆1, households whose fiscal authorities hold more than the median bond holding will
either lose less consumption than the household of the median bond holder or will gain
consumption. Since these households have lower marginal utilities of consumption than
the median bond holder’s household, they will lose at most as much utility from con-
sumption as the household of the median bond holder. Then given that the household
of the median bond holder has a net utility gain under ∆1, so will all households whose
fiscal authorities hold more bonds than the median bond holder. In either case, all
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households whose fiscal authorities hold more bonds than the median must have higher
utility under ∆1, hence MH(∆1) ≥ MH(∆2). This establishes necessity. The proof of
sufficiency is essentially identical.
The period 2 utility of the household in a low endowment country with bond position
bi from a bailout of ∆ for bond distributions {bj({y1i})}y1j=yH and {bj({y1i})}y1j=yL is
given by
UL(bi, BH , BL,∆) = u
(
y − bi −∆
1 + pi(BH , BL,∆)
)
− ψ(pi(BH , BL,∆))
Let bML (BL) denote the median of the support of the distribution of BL. Consider two
alternative values of the bailout ∆1 and ∆2. Let ML(∆1) denote that measure of coun-
tries in the distribution BL such that UL(bi, BH , BL,∆1) ≥ UL(bi, BH , BL,∆2) and let
ML(∆2) denote the measure of countries such that UL(bi, BH , BL,∆2) ≥ UL(bi, BH , BL,∆1).
Claim 5. ML(∆1) ≥ML(∆2) if and only if
UL(b
M
L (BL), BH , BL,∆1) ≥ UL(bML (BL), BH , BL,∆2)
The proof of Claim 5 is identical to that of Claim 4, with the signs switched.
Claims 4 and 5 establish that the election system for determining bailouts is a median
voter model. Low endowment country candidates will promise to accept bailouts if and
only if UL(b
M
L (BL), BH , BL,∆) ≥ UL(bML (BL), BH , BL,∆). High endowment country
candidates will anticipate this behavior and will choose bailouts to solve
max
∆
UH(b
M
H (BH), BH , BL,∆)
UL(b
M
L (BL), BH , BL,∆) ≥ UL(bML (BL), BH , BL,∆)
∆ ≥ 0 (B.10)
Before moving on with the definition of equilibrium notice that, if the distribution of
bond holdings is such that all high endowment countries buy nominal bonds B and all
low endowment countries sell nominal bonds B, or the distribution differs from such
a distribution only on a set of measure zero, as in the case of an individual deviation,
the central bank’s problem (B.9) coincides with the central bank’s problem in the static
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model (3.1), and hence the bailout problem (B.10) will coincide with the bailout problem
of the static model (3.3). Denote the solution of this problem ∆(BH , BL).
Finally, after observing the realizations of shock {y1i}, if country j receives a high
endowment shock, the fiscal authority in country j chooses how many bonds to buy
bj({y1i}) to maximize the welfare of the representative household, taking the price of
bonds, the bond positions of other countries, the bailout function ∆, and the central
bank’s inflation function pi as given
max
bj
u(y−q({y1i})bj)+βUH(bj , BH,i 6=j({y1i}), BL({y1i}),∆(BH,i 6=j({y1i}), BL({y1i})))
where I use the notation
BL({y1i}) = {bk({y1i})}y1k=yL
and
BH,i 6=j({y1i}) = {bk({y1i})}y1k=yH ,k 6=j
If country j receives a high endowment shock, the fiscal authority in country j chooses
how many bonds to sell bj({y1i})to maximize the welfare of the representative household,
taking the price of bonds, the bond positions of other countries, the bailout function ∆,
and the central bank’s inflation function pi as given
max
bj
u(y+ q({y1i})bj)+βUL(bj , BH({y1i}), BL,i 6=j({y1i}),∆(BH({y1i}), BL,i 6=j({y1i})))
Then
Definition. An equilibrium of the median voter model is a set of functions q({y1i}),
{bj({y1i})}, ∆(BH , BL), and pi(BH , BL,∆) such that
i.) bj solve the problems of fiscal authority j for all distributions of endowments {y1i},
taking all other functions as given
ii.) ∆ solves the bailout problem (B.10) taking pi as given
iii.) pi solves the central bank’s problem (B.9)
iv.) The bond market clears for all distributions of endowments {y1i}∫
y1j=yH
bj({y1i})dj =
∫
y1j=yL
bj({y1i})dj
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Clearly, in a symmetric equilibrium of the median voter model, the central bank’s prob-
lem and bailout problem will coincide with the bailout problem of the static model along
the equilibrium path, as the bond holdings of the median fiscal authority will equal the
bond holdings of all fiscal authorities, and the solution of both problems in the median
voter model will be unaffected by individual deviations from the equilibrium path by
fiscal authorities, as such deviations do not affect the value of the median of the bond
holding distribution or the objective of the central bank, which implies that, along the
equilibrium path, the problems of individual fiscal authorities in the median voter model
will coincide with the problems of fiscal authorities in the dynamic model, i.e. they will
take bailouts, inflation, and the representative fiscal authority’s bond holdings as given
when making their individual decisions.
B.3 Free-Rider Problem
The first order condition for a fiscal authority’s problem without a monetary union
(3.11) is given by
β
1 + pi(bi)
(
u′
(
y1i +
βbi
1 + pi(bi)
)
− u′
(
y − bi
1 + pi(bi)
))
−pi′(bi) βbi
(1 + pi(bi))2
(
u′
(
y1i +
βbi
1 + pi(bi)
)
− u′
(
y − bi
1 + pi(bi)
))
− βψ′(pi(bi))pi′(bi) = 0
(B.11)
Claim 6. If bi > 0, then pi
′(bi) > 0
Proof. If bi > 0, the solution of the central bank’s problem will be interior. From the
central bank’s first order condition, pi(bi) satisfies
bi
(1 + pi(bi))2
u′
(
y − bi
1 + pi(bi)
)
− ψ′(pi(bi)) = 0
Differentiating with respect to bi implies
1
(1 + pi(bi))2
u′
(
y − bi
1 + pi(bi)
)
− 1
(1 + pi(bi))3
u′′
(
y − bi
1 + pi(bi)
)
−pi′(bi)
[
2bi
(1 + pi(bi))3
u′
(
y − bi
1 + pi(bi)
)
−
(
bi
(1 + pi(bi))2
)2
u′′
(
y − bi
1 + pi(bi)
)]
− pi′(bi)ψ′′(pi(bi)) = 0
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Rearranging and solving for pi′ yields
pi′(bi) =
1
(1+pi(bi))2
u′
(
y − bi1+pi(bi)
)
− 1
(1+pi(bi))3
u′′
(
y − bi1+pi(bi)
)
2bi
(1+pi(bi))3
u′
(
y − bi1+pi(bi)
)
−
(
bi
(1+pi(bi))2
)2
u′′
(
y − bi1+pi(bi)
)
+ ψ′′(pi(bi))
which is positive if bi > 0 because u
′ > 0, u′′ > 0, and ψ′ ≥ 0 by assumption 1.
Suppose that the fiscal authority chose bi acting as if pi did not depend on bi, as fiscal
authorities do in a monetary union. In this case, they would choose bi such that
u′
(
y1i +
βbi
1 + pi(bi)
)
− u′
(
y1i +
bi
1 + pi(bi)
)
= 0 (B.12)
At such a value of bi, the left-hand side of (B.11) would be equal to
−βψ′(pi(bi))pi′(bi)
If the fiscal authority is borrowing bi > 0, then its central bank will set a strictly positive
inflation rate and pi′ will be positive (issuing more bonds leads to even higher inflation)
by Claim 6, which implies that this term will be negative. The fiscal authority could
improve welfare by decreasing bi. This is the essence of the free-rider problem in the
monetary union. If fiscal authorities ignore the effect of their debt issuance on the
inflation rate, as they do in the dynamic model of the monetary union, then debt and
inflation tend to be inefficiently high.
B.4 Solution of Quadratic Model
Monetary Union Outcomes
First, I will solve for bˆ∆, the optimal value of the real repayment from low endowment
countries to high endowment countries in period 2, assuming that it occurs at an interior
solution for inflation. For an arbitrary real repayment bˆ the first order condition of the
central bank’s problem for an interior solution is
1
2
bˆ[u′(y − bˆ)− u′(y − bˆ)] = ψˆ(1 + pi)
⇒ 1
2
bˆ[2(y¯ − y + bˆ)− 2(y¯ − y − bˆ)] = ψˆ(1 + pi)
⇒ 2bˆ2 = ψˆ(1 + pi)
74
This implies that the utility of a high endowment country from a real repayment bˆ is
given by
−[y¯ − y − bˆ]2 − 2bˆ2
where the second term is just the disutility from inflation ψˆ(1 + pi) implied by the
solution of the central bank’s problem. The first order condition for maximizing this
function is
2[y¯ − y − bˆ]− 4bˆ = 0
which implies that
bˆ∆ =
1
3
[y¯ − y]
and to guarantee that this corresponds to an interior solution for inflation requires the
parameter restriction
2
bˆ2∆
ψˆ
=
2
3 [y¯ − y]2
ψˆ
> 1
Notice that this restriction implies that in any equilibrium in which there are positive
bailouts the solution for inflation will be interior. I will make one further parameter
restriction to ensure the solution for inflation will be interior in any equilibrium in which
there are no bailouts. If there are no bailouts, the real value of the repayment will be
given by
bˆ =

1 + β
so for an interior solution, it must be the case that
2
(

1+β
)2
ψˆ
> 1
which implies
 > (1 + β)
(
ψˆ
2
) 1
2
Turning to the first period, recall that in equilibrium, the real interest rate is equal
to the natural rate, so fiscal authorities will borrow to to set consumption in period 1
equal to consumption in period 2. Note that there will be bailouts in equilibrium only
if real value of bonds required to equal consumption in the two periods assuming no
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bailouts 1+β is larger than the optimal real repayment bˆ∆ (This is true for any utility
specification. See Figure 3.2). Let ∗ be the value of  such that
∗
1 + β
= bˆ∆
The equilibrium of the dynamic model will have positive bailouts if  > ∗ and zero
bailouts otherwise. If bailouts are zero, in equilibrium real bonds will be equal to
bˆ =

1 + β
In both periods consumption of low endowment countries will be equal to
y − bˆ = y − 
1 + β
In both periods consumption of high endowment countries will be
y + bˆ = y +

1 + β
and the disutility of inflation will be
ψˆ(1 + pi) = 2bˆ2 = 2
(

1 + β
)2
If there are positive bailouts, then the real repayment in the second period will be equal
to the optimal real repayment bˆ∆. This implies that consumption in both periods for
low endowment countries will be equal to
y − bˆ∆ = y − 
∗
1 + β
and consumption in both periods of high endowment countries will be equal to
y − bˆ∆ = y − 
∗
1 + β
The disutility of inflation will be given by
ψˆ(1 + pi) = 2bˆ2∆ = 2
(
∗
1 + β
)2
Substituting these solutions into the utility function, the expected utility of households
in the monetary union is
VMU∆ () =
−(1 + β)[y¯ − y]
2 − (1 + 3β)
(

1+β
)2
 < ∗
−(1 + β)[y¯ − y]2 − (1 + 3β)
(
∗
1+β
)2
 ≥ ∗
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If bailouts are not allowed, then the expected utility of households in the monetary
union is
VMU () = −(1 + β)[y¯ − y]2 − (1 + 3β)
(

1 + β
)2
Outcomes Without Monetary Union
Note first that, if countries do not form a monetary union, fiscal authorities in high
endowment countries will be able equalize consumption in periods one and two by
saving. Since they save, the no-deflation constraint of the central bank will bind and
disutility from inflation will be at its minimum. Given that the real interest rate is
equal to the natural rate, this is obviously the best policy for fiscal authorities in high
endowment countries. This implies consumption in both periods in high endowment
countries will given by
y +

1 + β
and the disutility from inflation in high endowment countries will be equal to ψˆ (recall
ψ(pi) = ψˆ(1 + pi), so ψ(0) = ψˆ).
Now, consider the problem of low endowment countries. Suppose that the fiscal au-
thority wants to sell a value of real bonds equal to bˆ. If this level of real borrowing
corresponds to an interior solution for the central bank’s problem, the first order con-
dition for the central bank implies that
ψˆ(1 + pi) = bˆu′(y − bˆ) = 2bˆ[y¯ − y + bˆ]
Since the price of real bonds must equal β, if the fiscal authority chooses a value of bˆ
such that the solution for inflation is interior, bˆ must solve
max
bˆ
− [y¯ − y + − βbˆ]2 − β[y¯ − y + bˆ]2 − 2bˆ[y¯ − y + bˆ]
The first order condition for this problem is
2β[y¯ − y + − βbˆ]− 2β[y¯ − y + bˆ]− 2β[y¯ − y + bˆ]− 2βbˆ = 0
Solving for bˆ yields
bˆ =
1
2 + β
[− y¯ + y]
If I impose the parameter restriction y¯ > y+ , i.e. the upper-bound on consumption in
the quadratic utility function is sufficiently large compared to y, this value is negative,
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which implies that it can’t correspond to an interior solution of the central bank’s
problem. This implies that the fiscal authority in low endowment countries will never
issue enough debt to induce inflation from the central bank. Instead, they will issue as
much debt as possible such that the central bank will choose zero inflation. The central
bank’s first order condition implies that this corresponds to a real value of debt equal
to
bˆ∗ =
−[y¯ − y] +
√
(y¯ − y)2 + 8ψˆ
4
bˆ∗ > 0, and the parameter restriction imposed in the monetary union problem will imply
that bˆ∗ < 1+β (To see this, note that any value of the real repayment low endowment
countries make bˆ that induces inflation in the monetary union will also induce inflation
for low endowment countries without the monetary union. This is because the central
bank doesn’t weigh the loss inflation causes to creditors when choosing the inflation
rate in the no union case.). Note that the disutility from inflation for low endowment
countries will also be equal to ψˆ. These solutions imply that the expected utility of
countries without a monetary union is
V A() = −(1 + β)[y¯ − y]2 − 2 + β
2
2 − β(1 + β)
2
b∗2 + βb∗ − ψˆ
Notice that, because 0 < bˆ∗ < 1+β
V AL () < V
A() < V AH ()
where
V AL () = −(1 + β)[y¯ − y]2 −
2 + β
2
2 − ψˆ
and
V AH () = −(1 + β)[y¯ − y]2 − (1 + β)2 − ψˆ
V AL gives expected utility under the assumption that low endowment countries set bˆ = 0,
and V AH gives expected utility if low endowment countries could equalize consumption in
periods 1 and 2 (which would require setting bˆ = 1+β ) without inducing inflation from
the central bank. Note that, thus far, I have ignored the non-negativity constraints
on consumption. All values of consumption will be strictly non-negative if the fourth
parameter restriction y −  > 0 is satisfied.
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Choosing Parameters
Consider the problem of choosing model parameters ψˆ, y, y¯, and β such that ∃ an interval
[, ] such that ∗ ∈ [, ], ∃ ˜ ∈ [, ] such that ∀  ∈ [, ], the following conditions are
satisfied
i.) V A() > VMU () (No monetary union is preferable to a monetary union without
bailouts)
ii.) V A() > VMU∆ () if  < ˜ and V
A() < VMU∆ () if  > ˜ (A monetary union with
bailouts is preferable to no monetary union if  is large enough)
iii.) The parameter restrictions are satisfied
I will give a procedure that accomplishes this. First, ˜ must be a value of  such that
V A() = VMU∆ (), and if V
A() > VMU () ∀  ∈ [, ], then it must be the case that
V A(˜) = VMU (∗). Since V A and V AH are decreasing, the value of ˜ must be less than
the value ˜H such that V
A
H (˜H) = V
MU (∗). Finally, since ψˆ > 0, ˜H <  where
V AH () + ψˆ = V
MU (∗).  then solves
−2 + β
2
2 = −1 + 3β
1 + β
∗2 = −1 + 3β
1 + β
(
1
3
[y¯ − y](1 + β)
)2
This implies
 =
√
2(1 + β)(1 + 3β)
2 + β
× 1
3
× [y¯ − y]
The third parameter restriction requires that  < y¯ − y ∀  ∈ [, ]. From the above
equation, this will hold as long as (1+β)(1+3β)2+β < 9, so fix a value of β ∈ (0, 1) such that
this is satisfied (this holds at β = 0, so it will hold for sufficiently small β). Note that
2+β
2 <
1+3β
1+β for any β ∈ (0, 1), so ∗ < ¯. Note that
V A()− VMU () > V AL ()− VMU () =
3β − β2
2β
2 − ψˆ
The value in this expression will be positive if  > 1(ψˆ) =
(
2
3−β ψˆ
) 1
2
. Recall that the
second parameter restriction is that
 > (1 + β)
(
ψˆ
2
) 1
2
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This parameter restriction will be satisfied if  > 2(ψˆ) =
(
(1 + β)2 ψˆ2
) 1
2
. The first
parameter restriction is that
2
3
[y¯−y]2
ψˆ
> 1. Fix any value for y¯ − y greater than zero.
Choose a value of ψˆ such that 1(ψˆ) <
1
3 [y¯ − y](1 + β), 2(ψˆ) < 13 [y¯ − y](1 + β),
and
2
3
[y¯−y]2
ψˆ
> 1 (this is always possible for a sufficiently small value of ψˆ). Set  =
max{1(ψˆ), 2(ψˆ)}. This guarantees that V A > VMU on [, ], that ∗ ∈ [, ], and that
the first parameter restriction is satisfied. Notice that, because V A > VMU and that
V A(˜) = VMU (∗), it follows that ˜ > ∗, which implies ˜ ∈ [, ]. Choose y > . This
guarantees that the fourth parameter restriction y −  > 0 will be satisfied. Finally,
choose y¯ to match the fixed value of y¯ − y.
